

Religious Intolerance

A local human rights NGO reported that the local authorities disbanded the Grace Presbyterian Church after refusing it re-registration. In September 2000, an agency of the regional administration circulated a document entitled “The Main Directions of the Cultural Policy of the Administration of Khabarovsk: 2001-2005” which warned of the “threat” posed by religious minorities. The preamble of this document characterized Soviet era official ideology as having been “a protective barrier” against “every sort of confession and public organization of a Western type” that “are legally engaged in the elimination of the bases of the state and the destruction of national self-awareness through the substitution of native cultural values with those that are ontologically alien.” After attacking Muslims who have come to the region and dare to “assert in the city their spiritual values and customs,” the authors of the document warned of the threat “to state security in the sphere of culture and art” posed by minority religions and called for “opposing religious confessions and public organizations of the Western type through an alliance with the Orthodox Church” and the use of “public censorship.”¹⁰

The same NGO also reported that a series of classical music concerts (Mozart, Bach and Handel) planned by the Khabarovsk symphony orchestra to be held in a Protestant church was shut down by the regional authorities after the local Russian Orthodox bishop complained about the “demonic music” on the program.

In June 2001, a local newspaper referred to Pentecostals as a “sect,” warning that:

The entire North-East of our country is literally flooded with people belonging to this sect. In Siberia they are very visible: they fill large halls with their adepts... It is no coincidence that many members of the sect suffer from a depressive state, attempts at suicide are not rare among them... For some reason I felt that in this hall, it was more likely that Satan would appear [than God].¹¹

In July 2001, the American-Russian Relief Center reported that regional authorities had shut down 12 Pentecostal churches in Khabarovsk Kray, at times “using forceful methods: threats, beatings, arson and falsified criminal cases.”¹²

In August 2001, a local newspaper published an article attacking the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In covering a three day meeting the Jehovah’s Witnesses held in the Lokomotiv Stadium, the author chose only to write about an incident in which she saw a mother spanking her child. She presented this as evidence of “the cruelty of believers.”¹³

In November 2001, somebody threw a Molotov cocktail into a crowded Baptist church in Komsomolsk-na-Amure. Fortunately, parishioners quickly put the flames out and nobody was injured.¹⁴

PRIMORSKY KRAY

Estimated Jewish Population: 6,000-7,000 in Vladivostok.¹⁵



Komsomolsk-na-Amure
Baptist Church

Highlights From the Previous Report

Commenting on the October 1999 ban on the RNU in Primorsky Kray, the newspaper *Segodnya* wrote: “It is no secret that in Primorsky Kray, many soldiers and law enforcement agents, including senior officers, almost openly sympathize with the RNU.” Despite the ban, the RNU continued its activity in 2000, distributing antisemitic literature, along with the National Bolshevik Party, at the May Day 2000 rally in Vladivostok and near a Soviet era monument in the city’s main square.

During the December 1999 State Duma elections, Vladimir Boruchenko, an advisor to the regional governor, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, ran as a candidate from the vociferously antisemitic Movement to Support the Army. He narrowly lost by less than .5% of the vote, taking 2nd place.

Fear of China and Chinese migration was regularly incited by local politicians. In an article in September 2000, a Vladivostok-based reporter wrote that “[Governor Yevgeny] Nazdratenko himself is fond of whipping up anti-Chinese sentiments and of stating that most Chinese visitors come to Russia in order to commit crimes.” In March 2000, NTV reported that Muslims’ efforts to build a mosque continued to be blocked by the authorities. In July 2000, the local Russian Orthodox diocese issued a statement calling on the authorities to prevent a stadium rally organized by local Pentecostals from the Church of the Living God.

Extremist Groups

In a February 2001 article, Aleksandr Tarasov, a leading expert on skinheads in Russia, estimated that there are between several hundred and 1,000 skinheads in Vladivostok.¹⁶

Official Antisemitism

In a January 2001 interview with a local paper, Konstantin Pulikovsky—presidential plenipotentiary for the Far Eastern Federal District—accused then governor of Primorsky Kray Yevgeny Nazdratenko of believing in Jewish conspiracies:

He [Nazdratenko] chose a method of work whereby either the central government or worldwide Zionism was to blame for everything. Imagine this scene—I work as an assistant to the governor, I go see him to spend five to seven minutes with him to resolve a concrete question. However, the meeting lasts for 30 minutes, 25 of which are spent by him talking about Zionism.¹⁷

It should be noted that Mr. Pulikovsky and Mr. Nazdratenko are fierce political adversaries.

On October 24, 2001, three State Duma deputies held a press conference in the State Duma building to describe their recent trip to the Palestinian Authority. MPs Viktor Cherepkov (Primorsky Kray), Pavel Burdukov (Kaluga region), and Nikolai Bezborodov (Kurgan region) described their meetings with top Palestinian officials, including Yasir Arafat.

According to the article, Mr. Cherepkov—the former mayor of Vladivostok—blamed a “Jewish-Masonic conspiracy” for the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US. He accused Israel of using “the world system of Masonry” to organize the September 11 attacks in order to grant “at the sunset of the career of Ariel Sharon his old dream—Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates.” Even the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeevi by Palestinian terrorists near a hotel was blamed

on this supposed Jewish conspiracy, since in Mr. Cherepkov's opinion, only the Israeli special services could have penetrated such a well guarded hotel. As for Mr. Arafat, Mr. Cherepkov revealed that after meeting him, he prayed to God that Mr. Arafat would live a long life. All three of the MPs sent an appeal to the State Duma to prevent Russian citizens with Israeli citizenship from "taking up arms against Palestinians."¹⁸

A few days later, a Vladivostok newspaper quoted Mr. Cherepkov as claiming that the reason why Russia doesn't support Mr. Arafat is that: "[A]ll the central Russian media belongs to guys who have a certain ethnic tint and present the issue in ways that are convenient to Israel!" He added that Russia needs to arm the Palestinians so that they no longer have to resort to suicide bombings against "the Jewish occupiers."¹⁹

Antisemitic Incidents

A November 2000 article in a local paper reporting on the drawing of antisemitic graffiti on the walls of Vladivostok's Jewish Religious-Cultural Center shortly after Chief Rabbi Beryl Lazar's visit to the city cited local police officials as saying that: "[R]ecently, the number of acts of hooliganism and vandalism in relation to the Jewish Religious-Cultural Center and its members has risen."²⁰

A December 2000 editorial in *Arsenevskie vesti* predicting what the year 2001 would bring to Primorsky Krai residents had the following to say about inter-ethnic relations:

Already now few doubt that if teachers in Ussuriysk aren't paid their salaries for months, if heating doesn't work in Kavalerevo, and if walking on the sidewalks and staircases of Vladivostok in the winter isn't any less dangerous than taking a swim with crocodiles, then people of Jewish or Caucasian nationality will be blamed.²¹

Xenophobia

Fear of China and Chinese migrants remains high in the region. A January 2001 PONARS (Program on New Approaches to Russian Security) policy memo by Mikhail Alekseev—a political scientist who focuses on migration issues in the Russian Far East—began by arguing that fears of a Chinese "takeover" of Primorsky Krai are greatly exaggerated:

Unpublished data from the passport and visa registration service of Primorskii krai, interdepartmental memos from the Pacific Regional Directorate of the Russian Federal Border Service, and this author's interviews with [sic] Primorskii krai Migration Service chief suggest that the number of Chinese migrants in Primorskii krai would at best amount to approximately 1-1.5% of the local Russian population on any given day... this author conducted systematic visual observations on four trips to Primorskii kray (Primor'e) in 1999 and 2000 and found no evidence of Chinese presence that would be even remotely similar to Chinese presence in New York, San Francisco or even Moscow.

Nevertheless, almost 1/3 of respondents to a local poll believed that Chinese migration poses a threat to Russia, while 53% thought that it presents a strong threat to Primorsky Krai. Fifty-six percent of respondents disapproved of their relatives marrying Chinese and 57% favored supporting Cossacks to "ensure order" against Chinese migrants.²²

At a June 2000 press conference in Moscow, Dmitry Trenin—a leading expert on Russo-Chinese relations at the Moscow Carnegie Center—was quoted as saying:

Today it's bad when the police beat or pressure or rob Chinese in the [Russian] Far East. That is bad. But what I am scared of, to tell you the truth, is the situation going out of control—not when it's a policeman who beats or robs, but when a group of skinheads or non-skinheads go to a market and attack Chinese stands and start a pogrom. It's a pogrom that I'm afraid of, to tell you the truth. Because a pogrom would be, in my opinion, a direct path to nothing less than a Russo-Chinese conflict. A Chinese pogrom on the territory of Russia. Born out of the poverty of people in the region, the lack of a distinct government policy and the deep conviction of many Russians residents of the region that cannot compete with the Chinese, that the Chinese will push them out or force them to work for them. The government needs to closely watch this situation and prevent such a chain of events, because for Russia there can be nothing more terrible than a serious conflict with China.²³

In June 2001, RFE/RL reported that the campaign staff of Gennady Apanasenko—the Kremlin-backed candidate to succeed Nazdratenko as governor of Primorsky Kray—was trying to exploit fears of “the yellow menace” by flashing on the screen a graft of Russia's falling population compared to China's rising population during a campaign commercial.²⁴ Mr. Apanasenko eventually lost the race.

ENDNOTES FOR FAR EAST FEDERAL DISTRICT

¹ Partinform news agency, April 14, 2001.

² *Novaya Kamchatskaya pravda*, November 15, 2001.

³ FEOR. <http://www.fjc.ru/russiafr.htm>.

⁴ The Khabarovsk Regional Branch of the All-Russian Public Movement "For Human Rights," "Human Rights in the Regions of the Russian Federation: 2001: Events of the Year 2000," Moscow Helsinki Group, Volume 5, 304, 2001.

⁵ *Molodoy dalnevostochnik*, July 5, 2000.

⁶ *Molodoy dalnevostochnik*, August 23, 2000.

⁷ *Tikhookeanskaya zvezda*, August 1, 2001.

⁸ *Tikhookeanskaya zvezda*, May 16, 2001.

⁹ *Priamurskie vesti*, June 22, 2001.

¹⁰ The Khabarovsk Regional Branch of the All-Russian Public Movement "For Human Rights," "Human Rights in the Regions of the Russian Federation: 2001: Events of the Year 2000," Moscow Helsinki Group, Volume 5, 290-291, 2001.

¹¹ *Molodoy dalnevostochnik*, June 13, 2001.

¹² American-Russian Relief Center communication to UCSJ, July 7, 2001.

¹³ *Molodoy dalnevostochnik*, August 29, 2001.

¹⁴ NTV.ru, November 5, 2001.

¹⁵ RIA Novosti, November 9, 2000. The report cited Chief Rabbi of Russia Beryl Lazar.

¹⁶ *Vek*, February 16, 2001.

¹⁷ *Arsenevskie vesti*, January 26, 2001.

¹⁸ *Kommersant*, October 25, 2001.

¹⁹ *Novosti*, October 30, 2001.

²⁰ *Novosti*, November 2, 2000.

²¹ *Arsenevskie vesti*, December 29, 2000.

²² Mikhail Alekseev, "The Chinese Are Coming: Security Implications of Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East in the Local Public Opinion," PONARS policy memo series, January 2001.

²³ Federal News Service, June 2000.

²⁴ RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, June 20, 2001.

APPENDICES

ANTISEMITISM, XENOPHOBIA AND CHAUVINISM IN IDEOLOGY OF RUSSIAN EXTREMIST PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS

By Leonid Stonov

Director of UCSJ's International Bureaus and Activities

Knowing the ideology of chauvinists and extremists in Russia is important in order to develop a strategy and tactic to combat these dangerous phenomena. Many nationalistic parties and movements operate in Russia, and analysis of their ideology (sometimes it is not really an ideology but a set of ordinary chauvinistic sentiments) takes a volume or even more to write. Below is a short essay about the ideology of the most dangerous organizations. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has a very serious influence on many movements in Russia, which is why I have included a small chapter about some ideological issues of the ROC that are reflected in inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations.

Russian National Unity (RNU)

Today, many people have forgotten that the RNU appeared as a result of splitting the Dmitry Vasiliev's Society "Pamyat" ("Memory"), in the beginning of the 90's. Some "Pamyat" break ups were spontaneous, but most were organized by the state security services. A. Prybylovsky¹ presented a theory claiming that the RNU's active participation in events in Moscow from September-October of 1993 was a KGB planned action, i.e. Barkashov's RNU units in uniform with swastikas defended the Supreme Soviet and their occupation of Moscow Mayor building, thusly aggravating the democratic forces. Due to further internal conflicts in the RNU leadership, the party split into several parts. The Yuri Vasin group takes active part in establishing Baburin's "Party of the National Renaissance 'People's Will'" and Oleg Kassin's group – in the "Renaissance" party of Evgeny Ishenko and Konstantin Sevenard. The RNU has constant contacts with ROC priests and members of the RNU rely on the old forms—medieval—of Slavic Orthodoxy. They express an aggressive attitudes towards "enemies" imagined as being the democrats, Jews, people from Caucasus, Gypsies and others. The leaders of the RNU believe that the so-called national authority in Russia is a power of national hierarchy with leadership of all-nation boss. They think that such a structure corresponds with the historic specific of Russia and Russian people.² An All-National Gathering (National Sobor) will be established instead of the Parliament, it will be a national labor state. Propaganda of mix marriages, as a form of anti-Russian internationalism, will be forbidden. Leaders do not recognize national autonomies in the new future state. The RNU is oriented to violent actions, their "Code of Honor" reminiscent to the Code of Bandits, but instead of definition "Bandit" they use "Nation". The RNU presents a large threat to the society and state.

Skinheads

If soccer fans from "Jolly Nevsky" need only fights and scandals, skinheads have an "ideology" – to beat Gypsies, Africans, Asians, Caucasians, and Jews. Skinheads are the most primitive group of Nazi followers. Up until now, they did not meet resistance from the authorities. Moreover, their ideology is supported by some law-enforcement bodies. In St. Petersburg new magazine "Admiralteistvo", Oleg Karataev, former KGB officer, now lawyer-scientist, wrote: "Russian people has built their state for thousand years, some other people helped Russians, or were neutral, or actively impeded (as Polish, Germans, Tatars, Chechens, Cherkess, Jews – and it are a majority of such people)". "...Nation feeling for it enemies becomes especially strong, and attitude to them –

relentless". The most important point is that this magazine is published by the North-Western Federal Region of Russia (Victor Cherkesov, representative of President in this Federal Region, wrote the preface) with the help of the St.Petersburg administration.³

Skinheads are not a pure political movement, but a youth group with neo-Nazi racist ideology and symbols. There are no so-called "red skinheads" in Russia (as in Western Europe) with anarchy and anarchy-Communist tendencies in ideology. National-Bolshevik Party (Eduard Limonov), Union "Russian Youth", "Solidarity Movement" and some others actively work with skinheads in Moscow, National-Republican Party (Yuri Belyaev), National Bolsheviks and Pagans from Union of Veneds – in St. Petersburg. Many parties and movements try to rely on skinheads as on their social base and consider skinheads as "attack team of nowadays". Skinheads behavior is very aggressive, especially against, firstly, "strangers" (people from Caucasus, Asia, Blacks and, of course, Jews), then representatives of hostile youth sub-cultures (like hippies), political enemies (antifascists, leftists, democrats). Russian nationalism is also one of component of skinhead ideology. There are several thousand skinheads in each of the following big cities – Moscow, Krasnoyarsk, Petersburg, Tomsk, Irkutsk, Vladivostok, less – in Voronezh, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Krasnodar, Archangelsk, Volgograd, etc. We know very small numbers of racist and xenophobic skinheads actions are because the militia does not want to register such crimes as racist. If the criminal cases are at last opened against skinheads, the crimes are qualified as hooliganism. According to ADL Moscow Office Bulletin "Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Russia",⁴ more than 20 people were killed by skinheads in Russia in the last three years.

The leaders of skinheads in Russia educate them with Nazism, which is the worse kind of nationalism. The newspaper "Novye Izvestia"⁵ informed that skinheads disseminated information in leaflets in Moscow metro-stations and through people's mailboxes. Skinheads insisted on deportation of all foreigners, especially people from Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Russian MVD (Interior Ministry) and other officials expressed opinion that skinheads have no ideology. But it is not true, and Luidmila Alexeeva, chair of the Moscow Helsinki Group and President of the International Helsinki Federation, said to the "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" correspondent,⁶ that skinheads definitely had its ideology. The basis of skinhead ideology is Neo-Nazi-racist rhetoric in the style of "White Power". Antisemitism is a part of skinheads' mentality.⁷ Skinhead-intellectuals take a great interest to Paganism—Celt-Germanic and Slavic. They are very attractive for radical political forces. Half of the members of the Moscow-based RNU are skinheads. This Party's newspaper "Shturmovick" permanently publishes materials for skinheads. The Party "National Front" mostly consists of skinheads. Skin-Group "Russian Goal" is affiliated with the People's National Party. National-Bolshevik Party, "Solidarity" Movement, Union "Russian Youth" and others actively cooperate with skinheads. Aggressive behavior stereotypes are one of the peculiarities of skinheads.

It is extremely dangerous that skinheads conduct their actions together with People's National Party (A. Ivanov-Sukharevsky), and this Party's ideology is close to their views. There are signs that Ivanov-Sukharevsky's Party uses skinheads in its political interests. This leader described the Party's ideology in his interviews to the newspaper, "Moscow News":⁸ "Our Party differs from all previous parties – RNU, People Revolutionary Party of Russia and others – because we have well-composed ideology. Our outlook is named 'Rusism' or Brotherhood of white people. Our aim is power. Russia entered the epoch of revolutions, and this proves a process of globalization. Our revolution is white revolution, it is international. It will be united European state with Russian people in the leadership".

Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky recently visited Samara, and spoke before journalists about his party ideology. His People National Party is very nationalistic and supports repressive measures against strangers (non-Russians) in Russia.⁹ He said that when his party is in power, all Russians will be millionaires. The next revolution is expected in 2003-2005 with big street disturbances. One of the driving forces of this "Revolution" will be skinheads; the basis for their philosophy is "Russia for Russians".

For a long time, the Russian MVD and FSB officials did not recognize the existence of fascist organizations in Russia; they explained their activity as hooliganism. Only recently, General A. Chekalin, chief of the Public Security Department of the MVD, said that there were 13 Nazi-type youth organizations.¹⁰ In the Spring of 2002, the Russian mass-media paid a lot of attention to this problem on the eve of Hitler's days of birth and death (20th and 30th of April). They informed about dozens thousand young people, including skinheads, who used Hitler's symbolic and Nazi rhetoric. It is interesting that many Russian skinheads do not know that American and English skinheads are against swastikas and other German Nazi symbols.¹¹ As it was just after WW2, today many FSU people of the eldest generations, understood that Hitler's Nazi ideology won and continued to blossom in the fertile post-Soviet soil.

Here, we pay more attention to skinheads, because even if for several years they were considered to be ordinary street gangs, now everyone sees them as well organized terrorist groups. In K. Remneva's article "White Force of Brown Color",¹² it was said that only in March in Moscow skinheads seriously beat Senegal citizen, four Aeries, two students of Sri Lanka and killed one man from Caucasus. Even Russian President Putin expressed wariness about youth extremism.

Communists

During the Soviet time Communist Party organizations officially took the so-called internationalist position, antisemitic views were mostly expressed through anti-Zionistic motives, anti-Israel propaganda and in regarding to "international Zionist conspiracy". The Communist Party always was the ideological tool of the State antisemitism during the Stalin-Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko eras. Now the Communist Party is a big political party in Russia with 500,000 members, and received about 25% votes at the last Duma election in 1999. Unconcealed nationalists from the rightist part of the Communist Party openly expressed antisemitic views (Albert Makashov, Viktor Iliukhin, and Nikolay Kondratenko). Sometimes Party leader Gennady Zuganov exploits antisemitic rhetoric. The second big Communist organization, "Labor Russia" (Victor Anpilov), is more stalinistic and radical, antisemitic rhetoric is in almost each speech of the leaders, as well as in their newspapers. Anpilov's anti-Semitism ideologically is not differing from position of KPRF.

The Other National-Patriots and Ethnic Nationalists

Liberal-Democratic Party (Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, 500,000 members) and Russian All-People Union (Sergey Baburin, 50,000) often come out against "non-Russian domination" in business and official structures, against international Zionism, for ethnic Russian priority in all state bodies.¹³ Their newspapers "LDPR" ("Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia"), "Nashe Vremya" ("Our Time") and "Vremya" ("Time") always disseminate extremist anti-Caucasian and antisemitic statements and views. National-Bolshevik Party (Eduard Limonov, 6,000, main newspaper "Limonka")¹⁴ is one of the biggest nationalistic "revolutionary" organization. One of its antisemitic myths is that Jews have

stolen everything, and Russians live as in Africa. These three parties can be described as imperial national patriots. The ideology of so-called ethnic nationalists contents of strong and aggressive anti-Semitism, including ideas of world Jewish conspiracy, Christian anti-Semitism, 100% Jewish emigration from Russia, many follow Hitler plan of the “final solving the Jewish question”. These nationalists can be divided in two groups: “old rightists” oriented to pre-revolutionary right wing radical organizations, and “new rightists”, who include racists, national-socialists, neo-Pagans and others. “The old rightists” include “Russian Party” of Alexander Miloserdov, “Black Hundred” of Alexander Shilmark, “National-Patriotic Front “Pamyat” of Dmitry Vasiliev, “Russian All-People Movement” of Alexander Bazhenov, “Union “Christian Renaissance” of, Vladimir Osipov, “The Congress of Russian Communities” of Dmitry Rogozin. These groups are closely tight to the conservative wing of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), their ideology is widely spread among Cossacks movement. Antisemitism of “The Old Rightists” has religious and “conspiracy type” (“all world Jewish conspiracy”) character. “The New Rightists” ideology is oriented to European Neo-Fascism (the biggest such organization are RNU and skinheads)¹⁵. These groups also follow neo-Paganist views (pure racist ideology). Russian National Union (now movement “Russian Action”, leader Konstantin Kasimovsky), People’s National Party (Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky), National-Republican Party of Yuri Belyaev and Party “National Front” of Ilya Lazarenko cooperate with skinheads in order to move them to be more Nazistic. Football fanats, rock- and pank- youth subcultures also spread strong xenophobic and antisemitic views.

In spite of a small number of members of Limonov’s Party, it occupies the special—very nationalistic—place in the political spectrum, being a special cocktail of communist and fascist ideology. One well known ideologist of this Party, Alexander Dugin, determined the main goals of National-Bolshevism: to bring closer bolshevist, monarchist and even fascist nationalists; to found this rapprochement on a neo-imperialist consensus; and, by bundling all these anti-liberal forces, to wage a struggle against democratization in Russia both at the street level and in the minds of the Russian people. He supports an idea of Euro-Eurasian military partnership and Eurasian expansion.¹⁶ A. Dugin developed an even more differential form of antisemitism—pro-Zionist antisemitism. This form differentiates between “subversive, destructive Jews without a nationality” and good, traditionalistic—that is, Zionist and Eurasian—Jews. Dugin proposed to use Islam as a resource for expanding an anti-Western National-Bolshevik Front. Besides that, not only A. Dugin but some others elaborated the concept of a New Socialism primarily and expressively as anti-liberalism. Many researchers concluded that National-Bolshevism is both a right-wing extremist ideology and simultaneously the locus of intersection between right-wing and left-wing extremist nationalism – and thus it is the basis for convergence of these two groups themselves.

Almost all extremist organizations express racist and xenophobic views and propaganda. The most consecutive racist with aggressive attitude to all non-Russians are: LDPR (V. Zhirinovsky Party), the People’s National Party of A. Ivanov-Sukharevsky, the National Front of I. Lazarenko, the Right Radical Party of S. Zharikov and A. Arkhipov, the Russian National Union of A. Vdovin and K. Kasimovsky, the Russian National Union of N. Vorobyev, and others. The following focused exactly on antisemitism and publicizing it in the most opened form: the Legion “Werewolf”, the “Pamyat” of D. Vasiliev, the Russian Orthodox National Sobor of E. Schekatikhin and V. Antonov, the RNU of A. Barkashov, the Russian Party of V. Miloserdov, the Union “Christian Renaissance” of V. Osipov and V. Demin, the Union of Veneds of V. Besverkhy, and the “Black Hundred” of A. Shtilmark. There are signs of coalescence of political extremists with criminals, but also criminals who moved to politics through extremist groups.

Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Influence on the Ideology of Some Extremist Groups

ROC is not a party or movement, its position is described here because this “main” Russian confession is a direct influence on the ideology of a large part of the society and its components—different parties and movements. Vyacheslav Likhachev in his article “Antisemitism and ROC in the post-Soviet Russia”¹⁷ noted that the ROC continued to hold to traditional, middle-ages style, Christian antisemitism. Ultra-reactionaries in the ROC pay very special attention to the “Jewish question”. Nevertheless, the author considers that traditional religious hatred towards Jews will not splash out to the broad public. He thinks that the process of the modern religion renaissance is very superficial and does not touch a fundamental base of mass outlook. At the same time, V. Likhachev concluded that anti-Judaism and antisemitism still are parts of people’s outlook.

Religious hatred is not an unchanging capacity. The rate of this intolerance differs depending on dogmas of concrete confessions, peculiarities of epoch, cultural arenas and levels, etc. We also need to understand that peculiarities of the dogmas and general mentality of the Eastern Christian Church is conservatism and resistance to reforms, especially if they refer to the basis of beliefs. It is why revision of official doctrine about Jews is very problematic now in the ROC (in comparison with revisions that took place in Catholic and the most numbers of Protestant denominations). As everybody knows, after the Holocaust, the Western Christian denominations acknowledged the Church’s responsibility for antisemitism and officially removed the main traditional accusations of Jews in killing G-d. Due to many reasons, such revisions are not happening in the ROC and we do not expect them in nearest future. Anti-Judaism and anti-Jewish sentiments are published in many books and newspapers issued by the ROC. Multi-centuries church’s anti-Judaism is one of the sources of “modern racist antisemitism”¹⁸. Anti-Judaism and antisemitism are parts of their ideology and mentality, and it is problematic that this situation will be changed in the nearest future.

From the other side, as we mentioned above, some researchers (especially V. Likhachev¹⁹ and A. Verkhovskiy²⁰ pointed out that the process of the renaissance of modern religiosity is very superficial and does not touch the fundamental basis of mankind. Many people are comfortable with the ritual side of religion, and do not want to think about philosophy and theology. Nevertheless, one of the mainstreams in Russian Orthodoxy is Slavic Orthodoxy fundamentalism. One theorist of this wide spread ideology is Konstantin Dushenov, editor in chief of the newspaper “Russ Pravoslavnaya, former secretary of late St. Petersburg Metropolitan Iowan, who published, in 2002, the book “Mystery of Lawlessness in Historic Fate of Russia”. He formulated the doctrine of the Metropolitan Iowan as an Orthodoxy Fundamentalism program: “Russian democracy is Suborns”; “Russian ideology is Orthodoxy”; “Russian imperialism is Derzhavnost”. Society “Radonezh”, “Union Christian Renaissance”, “Black Hundred” and some others express such views. K. Dushenov in 1999, before the Duma election, issued a declaration²¹ with support of G. Zuganov’s People Patriotic Union of Russia (Russian abbreviation is NPSR) and V. Varennikov’s broad “communo-patriotic” block “Victory”, because these two organizations were ideologically close in propaganda of the “Russian Orthodox Slavic Socialism”. Father Superior Alexis (Prosvirin) claimed solidarity with A. Makashov in 1998 after his antisemitic statements. According to Father Superior Alexis, Apostle Paul’s words “Neither Ellyn, nor Jew in Christ”, are “Not for us, sinful”.²² A. Makashov’s and Alexis’ ideology is “Slavic Orthodox Stalinism”.

The Sretensky Cloister in downtown Moscow, led by Archbishop Tikhon (Shevkunov) (there were non-confirmed rumors that he was President Putin’s confessor), became one of the biggest church

publishing houses with its own web site, "Pravoslavie.Ru". Together with the newspaper and radio-station "Radonezh", they actively disseminate Slavic Orthodox Fundamentalist's views.²³ During 1999-2001, many fundamentalist organizations struggled for Slavic Orthodox anti-globalism; an individual number of taxpayers (Russian abbreviation is INN) became a symbol and main bugaboo of this campaign. The West, according to this campaign, was again presented as a mystic enemy of Russian Orthodoxy.

Conclusion

Nationalism is peculiar to all national-patriots without any exclusion, but there are wide spectrums of them. The newspaper "Den" publicizes new Eurasian thinking. A. Prokhanov and A. Dugin try to be above an ordinary Russian nationalism, they present themselves as nationalists of non-existent "Eurasian nation". The National-Bolshevik Party feels nostalgia towards the unity of the Russian people. This party thinks about the Imperial and Power idea. We can define such ideology as nationalism of some global ethnos. All near-Fascist groups plan the future state system as racist, which is forwarded for discrimination and suppression of ethnic minorities. The target of such national-chauvinism can be different people, firstly Jews and Caucasian people. Hatred towards them has different "reasons". If Jews are "traditional enemies", hatred towards Caucasian people also was peculiar in old Russia, but it never had such scale as in the last decade in Russia. It became one of the main phobias since perestroika. National-patriotism is transformed to racism in the broadest sense of this definition. All these parties and movements have aggressive anti-Western, especially anti-American, direction. The West to them is the source of all defects and the main source of harm for Russia. The West is associated with liberalism, which is claimed by the national-patriots as the main enemy. Militarism is a common peculiarity for all "patriotic" parties and movements. They dream about restoring the military superpower Russia. National-Patriots take a great interest in Slavic ancient things. There is no real economic doctrine in their ideology.

ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX 1

- ¹ V. Pribilovsky, "Non Free Radicals", *Magazine*, Number 8, March 5, 2002.
- ² <http://www.rne.org>.
- ³ *St. Petersburg Times*, March 2, 2001.
- ⁴ ADL Moscow Office Bulletin "Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Russia", Number 12, April-May 2001.
- ⁵ *Novye Izvestia*, Number 27, February 14, 2002.
- ⁶ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 12, 2002.
- ⁷ Informational Bulletin of ADL and RJC, Number 12, 2001.
- ⁸ "Moscow News", Number 15, April 2002.
- ⁹ "Reporter", #11 (132), March 2002.
- ¹⁰ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, Number 68, April 16, 2002.
- ¹¹ *VEK*, Number 39, 1999.
- ¹² K. Remneva, "White Force of Brown Color", *Ezhednevny Journal*, March 26, 2002.
- ¹³ V. Zhirinovskiy, "Russian Question in LDPR" *LDPR*, Number 5, 107, May 2000, p 2.
- ¹⁴ Pre-election NBP program, "Limonka", Number 17, 1995.
- ¹⁵ A. Verkhovskiy, *Panorama*, National-Patriotic Organizations of Russia, 2002.
- ¹⁶ A. Dugin, "New Socialism", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, February 2001.
- ¹⁷ V. Likhachev. "Antisemitism and ROC in the Post-Soviet Russia", *Judaica*, Volume 5, Number 4, pp. 292-313, 2002.
- ¹⁸ S. Lezov, National Idea and Christianity, p 101-103, 1997.
- ¹⁹ V. Likhachev. "Antisemitism and ROC in the Post-Soviet Russia", *Judaica*, Volume 5, Number 4, pp.
- ²⁰ A. Verkhovskiy, "Political Xenophobia", *Panorama*, Volume 28, Number 4, 2000.
- ²¹ *Rus Pravoslavnaya*, Number 9, 2001.
- ²² *Rus Pravoslavnaya*, Number 1, 1999.
- ²³ Radio Broadcasting, "Radonezh", January 2001.

THE NEW FACE OF STATE ANTISEMITISM IN RUSSIA¹

At the end of the meeting with journalists, the Chief Rabbi of Russia touched on the problem of antisemitism, stating that, in his opinion, there is none in Russia although individual expressions of it by young people, aggressive ones, nevertheless occasionally occur. *Kommersant*, August 7, 2001.²

At first glance, Chief Rabbi Beryl Lazar's statement reproduced above makes no logical sense—how could somebody on the one hand assert that there is no antisemitism in Russia, but then add that “individual expressions of it” occur? I would argue that there are two reasons why Rabbi Lazar and others would see this and similar paradoxical statements as perfectly logical: psychological and political.

The psychological factor stems from the history of antisemitism in the Soviet period. Under the Soviet regime, antisemitism became state policy, reflected in vicious antisemitic campaigns in the government-controlled press (to which there was no permitted alternative), arrests of Jewish activists and Hebrew teachers, mass refusals of the right to emigrate and discriminatory quotas on admission to higher education or certain prestigious professions.

The word *antisemitizm* in Russian is therefore understood by many Russian Jews to solely mean the official, state sponsored antisemitism of the past. When these same people describe antisemitic acts committed by non-state actors, they more often than not precede it with the word *bytovoy* (“day to day” or “street level”). This sometimes gives rise to some interesting linguistic dissonance. For example, in July 2001, I was in Moscow meeting with Russian Jewish activists my organization had just hired to monitor antisemitism in 42 cities. When we asked them to give short reports about antisemitism in their home towns, some started their presentation by saying, “There is no antisemitism in our city” and then talked for 10 or 15 minutes about neo-Nazi groups, cemetery desecrations, beatings and harassment of Jews on the street or at work, and a whole series of other incidents that we in the West would only term antisemitic.

On the political level, Russian Jewish leaders sometimes use the formulaic phrase “There is no state antisemitism in Russia” to play down levels of antisemitism in order to curry favor with the government. The government controlled media occasionally takes this a step further by distorting the Jewish leadership's message to avoid embarrassing news about antisemitism. For example, a November 2001 meeting of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR—Rabbi Lazar's organization) passed a resolution stating that while there is no state antisemitism in Russia, incidents of *bytovoy* antisemitism continue to cause concern, but the government newspaper *Rossiyskaya gazeta* and the government television channel RTR both chose to ignore the latter part of the resolution and opened their coverage of the meeting with the same words—“There is no state antisemitism in Russia.”³

The same formula has long been used by government officials to play down the problem of antisemitism. William Korey describes an April 20, 1993 meeting between President Yeltsin and Chief Rabbi Adolf Shaevich⁴ in the following way:

President Yeltsin, at a meeting with religious leaders, was asked by Russian Chief Rabbi Adolf Shaevich, to take a clear position against an increasingly “organized and open” antisemitism. As in the past, the president chose to avoid a direct response; instead, he simply asserted that antisemitism did not exist on a *state* level [emphasis in the original]. But Rabbi Shaevich was not talking about the state level at all. It was on a public, social level that

antisemitism flourished. To this potent danger, the Kremlin's response remained a deafening silence.⁵

More recently, at a February 2000 meeting in San Francisco with Jewish activists, Russian Consul-General Yuri Popov minimized the problem of antisemitism by asserting that "there is no official antisemitism" in Russia.

Aside from serving overtly political ends, it is hard to see what relevance this phrase has today—ten years after the collapse of the USSR. Certainly, anybody who cares about the fate of the Russian Jewish community is grateful that the terrible practices of Soviet era state sponsored antisemitism have ended, especially in light of the miraculous renaissance of Jewish life that is taking place in Russia today. This preoccupation with the dark past is a dangerous practice, which does more to obscure the dangers facing Russian Jews than it does to explain the amazing progress they, their government, and their country have made. The new opportunities that Russian Jews have been able to take advantage of over the past ten years have been accompanied by a series of problems that could not have existed in the Soviet period. Despite President Putin's efforts at re-centralization, epitomized by his worrisome phrase "The dictatorship of law," most Russians now live at the mercy of local leaders largely beyond Moscow's control, some of whom collaborate with antisemitic groups and incite antisemitism through media under their control. The justice system, as a rule, fails to protect Jews from antisemitic hate crimes, despite half-hearted efforts by the central government to crack down on hate groups, or enforce laws banning hate speech. All of these phenomena are the new forms of state sponsored antisemitism in Russia.

Dangerous Alliances

The average Russian citizen's definition of *vlast'* (the authorities, the bosses) has changed since the days when Moscow micro-managed the sprawling, 11 time zone large empire that was the USSR. Nowadays, the relationship between the citizen and the state is much more likely to be defined by how the local authorities treat him, rather than what goes on in Moscow. Writing in December 2001 on the results of Putin's efforts to reassert central control, Robert Orttung, editor of the East-West Institute's Russian Regional Report, asserts that:

The purpose of this reform was the reassert federal control over functions that it had lost to the regions during the Yeltsin era. During the late 1990s, the governors gained inordinate control over Russia's financial and natural wealth resources, the country's law enforcement agencies, and the regional media. In many cases the governors exerted complete control over the territories they ruled, simultaneously disregarding federal law and repressing regional demands for more accountable government. The typical governor controlled his fiefdom through strong-arm rule to prevent any encroachments on his power.

"Overall," Orttung finds, "Putin's main reforms of the country's federal system have yet to produce tangible results."⁶ In other words, despite some progress under President Putin, it is still the local authorities, and not Moscow, who really represent *vlast'* to most Russians.

In recent years, examples of collaboration between regional and municipal authorities and antisemitic hate groups, most notably the violent neo-Nazi group Russian National Unity (RNU), have come to light. While the RNU itself has been severely weakened by a three way split, and while in some cases such collaboration may no longer take place, the fact that local police and politicians thought in the very recent past that working with Russia's most notorious hate group was a good idea raises serious concerns about their attitudes towards Jews and other minority groups.

What motivates this despicable collaboration? In a few cases, regional leaders are openly antisemitic and/or racist. However, the most common reason appears to be that poorly paid and badly trained police have not proven adequate in the struggle against crime, which has spiraled out of control in recent years. Groups like the RNU or some extremist Cossack organizations offer to “maintain order” at low cost, freeing up scarce resources for other uses. In addition, these groups tend to target not just widely disliked ethnic or religious minorities, but NGOs, environmentalists, liberal political activists, and journalists, some of whom have proven to be a thorn in the side of regional officials, especially in Communist dominated regions.

The *Moscow Times* reported in August 1999 that local police work together with RNU activists to patrol the streets of Kostroma and Yaroslavl and hold target practice together. According to UCSJ’s Bryansk monitor, the RNU and city police work together to “maintain order” in at least one Bryansk night club. In Stavropol, a newspaper reported that the RNU guards several schools, two hospitals and a maternity ward with the support of the mayor.⁷ The RNU is reportedly represented in official public advisory councils, traditionally made up of local NGOs and ethnic/religious societies, attached to the mayor of Saratov and the legislature and governor of Saratov Oblast. In October 1999, a Volgograd newspaper reported that the RNU in the city of Volzhsky was guarding the building where the city administration and the local legislature are situated.⁸

How has the central government reacted to these dangerous alliances? For the most part, the response has been half-hearted at best, though there are some signs that President Putin is seriously concerned by the problem.

The period between late 1998 and late 1999 was a time of severe political and economic instability in Russia, which in turn triggered growing manifestations of antisemitism and extremism. The RNU’s strength in the provinces received regular media attention. Central government officials responded to this negative publicity, as well as a letter of concern from 98 US Senators, with vows to stamp out the RNU and control antisemitic outbursts.

Since late 1998, the Ministry of Justice has repeatedly pledged to send two bills, one banning political extremism and another banning the use of Nazi symbols, to the Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament). Throughout the late Yeltsin period, the Duma was dominated by the Communists and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—both parties that have promoted antisemitism and used rhetoric that could be interpreted as crimes under these proposed laws—so neither bill ever had a realistic chance of passage. However, the December 1999 elections and Putin’s enormous popularity have resulted in a more compliant Duma. In November 2000, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov urged the Ministry of Justice to push the anti-Nazi symbol legislation through the Duma, and it seemed that these bills would at last become law.

However, by February 2001, government interest in passing the bills had waned to the point that when a Duma committee voted to dump them, even Duma Deputy Pavel Krasheninnikov, a former Minister of Justice who had presided over the drafting of both bills, was quoted in the media supporting the decision. At the time, Krasheninnikov claimed that political extremism was no longer a serious threat in Russia, and if it becomes so again in the future, it can be countered by using already existing legislation.

This last assertion is crucial, because for the last several years both central and regional authorities have justified their inaction against the RNU and similar organizations by claiming that existing legislation is so flawed that until new laws on political extremism and Nazi symbols are passed, they could do nothing against a legally registered branch of the RNU, which has been registered in around two dozen regions. This is, at best, suspect reasoning. Here is how the newspaper *Izvestiya* in a May 2000 article summed up the way Russian officials have resisted taking serious action against hate groups:

When a Moscow prosecutor was asked: 'Tell me, does the exhortation to "kill Jews, save Russia!" require a psycholinguistic expert study in order to bring the person to justice?', the prosecutor honestly replied: 'Yes.' Such are the ideas about life held by certain law enforcement officers, thanks to whom those described as fascists, Nazis, national extremists, and ultra-nationalists remain at liberty.

It is not at all the case that the legal basis for punishing political extremists of a clearly pronounced fascistic persuasion is inadequate. But it is the case that most prosecutors and judges do not want to punish antisemites and deep down some are their supporters...

For several years the authorities have cultivated the myth that the existing legislative base is inadequate to punish people for political extremism. The myth has proved to be quite harmful, to put it mildly...

The Criminal Code alone has five articles making it possible to bring political extremists to justice: 'organizing an illegal armed formation or participating in it;' 'organizing an association that infringes the identity and rights of citizens;' 'publicly calling for a violent change of the Russian Federation's constitutional order;' 'inciting national, racial, or religious hatred;' and 'publicly calling for the outbreak of an aggressive war.'⁹

There are positive signs, however, of movement on anti-extremism legislation over the past few months. At a meeting with UCSJ activists in July 2001, Vice-Premier Valentina Matvienko promised that anti-extremism legislation will soon be passed. After 300 skinheads rampaged in a Moscow market on October 30, 2001, killing three dark-skinned traders, President Putin instructed the Ministry of Justice to speed up work on a draft law on extremism.

A more effective tool that the central government used against the RNU was to pressure regional authorities to take action on their own against the group's followers. In Moscow (April 1999), Karelia (January 2001),¹⁰ Primorsky Krai (October 1999), and Sverdlovsk, the local authorities stripped the RNU of its registration, making its activities illegal.

Other regions, however, reacted to the campaign from the center in the tradition of the Potemkin village. In Volgograd, for example, two RNU members caught beating up a Moroccan student were arrested, a grenade was confiscated from another RNU member, some RNU posters were torn down in a bathhouse and some sort of "fascist literature" was seized. Upon reporting these results to the center, the local authorities declared the problem of extremism in their region "solved."

In Stavropol, the center's campaign was at first made into a complete travesty. Complying with a presidential decree to set up official commissions in every region to fight fascist groups, the local authorities set up their region's commission by appointing six out of its 11 members from the ranks of the RNU.¹¹ By 1999, the local authorities decided to make at least some effort, and managed to arrest two RNU activists, fine them six rubles each, and then release them.

ANTISEMITISM IN MEDIA CONTROLLED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES

In some cases, media controlled by the local authorities or by the local branch of the ruling Communist Party engage in antisemitic publishing, reflecting the regional bosses' antisemitic world view. The official newspaper of the Oryol regional administration—*Orlovskaya pravda*—has run articles comparing Zionism to fascism, praising a local neo-Nazi leader and accusing Monica Lewinsky of being an Israeli agent. Newspapers close to the regional administration of Bryansk regularly publish antisemitic articles. *Bryanskaya pravda*—the official paper of the “Patriotic Bryansk” political movement, whose membership includes the governor and other top officials—consistently runs antisemitic stories. In March 1999, the newspaper *Bryansky rabochy*, which is subsidized by the Bryansk regional administration, ran a positive article about the RNU describing how the RNU teaches hundreds of local children combat skills and supposedly keeps them away from lives of crime and drugs, as well as smoking and drinking.¹²

The official newspaper of the Vladimir regional administration, *Vladimirskie vesti*, has published articles claiming that it is possible that Tsar Nicholas II was “ritually murdered” by Jews and that “Zionists” and the Mossad are working to discredit the Russian Orthodox Church.

FAILURE OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM TO PROSECUTE ANTISEMITES

The Russian justice system as a rule fails to protect Jews. This is true both of physical attacks on Jews and Jewish property, in connection with which arrests are very rarely made, and in the equally rare enforcement of laws prohibiting the incitement of ethnic or religious hatred. This is a passive form of state antisemitism. The near total failure of the Russian justice system to punish these acts of physical and rhetorical violence encourages a feeling of impunity in antisemites, and thus represents a direct threat to the safety of Russian Jews.

Failure to Punish Antisemitic Violence

In 1998, Yaakov Barotzkin, an educational administrator at the Migdal Or religious school in Moscow, was brutally beaten by eight skinheads on the school's campus. Three days later, the same skinheads beat Barotzkin's assistant, who wears a kippa and a beard, with sticks and fists, after yelling, “Here's the rabbi!” In both instances, the police failed to apprehend the attackers.

In October 1998, Zalman Yoffe, the chief rabbi of Nizhny Novgorod, was beaten by two unidentified attackers. He was taken to the hospital with head injuries. In a statement related to the press through his wife, Rabbi Yoffe said that the incident was clearly an antisemitic attack. The police said they would “take all necessary measures” to find the suspects. However, there have been no reports of any arrests in connection with this assault.

In Moscow, three bombings and attempted bombings of synagogues and other Jewish sites took place in the Summer of 1999, but nobody was ever arrested for them.

On September 17, 2000 a Jewish Sunday school in Ryazan was attacked by 15 neo-Nazi thugs armed with metal chains, who burst into the school, smashing windows, furniture, and an art exhibit while shouting death threats and fascist slogans at the 25 Jewish children studying there. The reaction of the authorities to this attack on the Jewish community was extremely weak. Shortly afterwards, local

police sources were quoted in the media as saying that four of the attackers had been identified, but even though the youths pose “some social danger, there is no need to take them into custody.”¹³ Police refused to characterize the attack as a hate crime or to confirm that the youths were members of any neo-Nazi group.

On July 29, 2001 unidentified arsonists unsuccessfully attempted to burn down a synagogue in Kostroma. Luckily, synagogue employees reacted quickly and managed to bring most of the blaze under control during the 12 minutes it took the fire department to arrive. At the time of writing, there have been no arrests in connection with this case.

On August 16, 2001 unidentified arsonists attempted to burn down a synagogue in Ryazan, causing significant damage. Nobody has been arrested for that arson either.

In sharp contrast to Rabbi Lazar’s public rhetoric, which often minimizes the problem of antisemitism, in September 2001, FEOR’s newsletter the following antisemitic attacks, which, at the time of writing, have led to no arrests:

Regrettably, we must report that the Rosh Hashanah holidays witnessed new outbreaks of antisemitism. The hypothesis that these are only isolated, ruffian acts turned out to be misleading. We are able to claim with certainty that these events bear a trace of radical nationalist involvement.

Two Russian youths attacked Rabbi Joel Maers and his two elderly companions at the synagogue in Orenburg on September 19. They shouted epithets, knocked down an elderly gentleman, and threw off the Rabbi’s hat and kippa, breaking his glasses.

An equally distressing incident happened in Omsk, where three young hooligans cursed and shouted “Heil Hitler” while making Nazi gestures. Rabbi Asher Krichevsky, an Israeli Rabbi serving in the Omsk Ohr Chadash community, was attacked, along with his relative Menachem Margolin. An additional ten ruffians then joined the fray, knocking off the Rabbi’s hat and kippa and throwing them onto the roadway. The attack was only halted at the police station, although the police refused to interfere and claimed that they were only authorized to protect the station.

A group of “Mesivta” yeshiva students was attacked in the Marina Roscha Synagogue in Moscow on September 23. The boys were returning to their dormitory when they were attacked by a group of skinheads yelling “Beat the Yids.” Although some of the students managed to escape, several were seriously injured.

The Moscow Choral Synagogue (on Spasogolenischevsky Lane) was desecrated on September 24. A black swastika and antisemitic slogans were painted on the front of the building. A criminal complaint was filed.¹⁴

Failure to Enforce Laws Against Hate Speech

Hate speech is illegal in Russia under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. The drafters of these laws were clearly taking into account the fact that yelling “Beat the Jews!” (or the Chechens or the Protestants, etc.) in an unstable, multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country like Russia is the equivalent of yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater. The numerous bloody conflicts that have arisen in the post-Soviet space and in Yugoslavia amply testify to the danger such hate speech entails. Here are some of the most egregious examples of how this law is regularly violated with near total impunity:

In a February 1998 speech, then Governor Nikolai Kondratenko of Krasnodar Krai used the words “Kike,” “Kike-Masons,” “cosmopolitans,” and “Zionists” 61 times. He accused Jews of disguising

themselves as Russians and infiltrating into important governmental positions. Governor Kondratenko accused Jews of bringing homosexuality to Russia, of causing the Chechen war, and of destroying the Communist Party and the Russian Orthodox church. Government responses to Governor Kondratenko's clear violations of laws banning incitement of ethnic hatred were extremely weak. In April 1998, regional prosecutors in Krasnodar dismissed allegations of inciting antisemitism brought by a citizens group called the Congress of Russian Intelligentsia against the governor. After the governor explained to local prosecutors that he only criticizes Zionism, not Jews, they reportedly decided that there was no legal basis to charge him. A month later, the office of the Prosecutor General of Russia dismissed similar allegations against Governor Kondratenko, this time brought to the authorities' attention by the Krasnodar Jewish community. In a letter to the president of the Russian Jewish Congress, the Prosecutor General's Office reportedly justified its decision by saying that Governor Kondratenko had not targeted Jews, but Zionists, whom the UN determined in 1975 subscribe to a racist ideology.

In October 2000, the five year old case against neo-Nazi writer Viktor Korchagin was restarted. Jewish groups had brought a criminal complaint against Mr. Korchagin for inciting ethnic hatred, and he was convicted in 1995, but in a sick twist of irony was immediately set free under an amnesty in honor of the 50th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Mr. Korchagin then wrote another book, in which he cited "Mein Kampf" favorably and attacked Jews. The same Jewish groups brought their criminal complaint again, but the case was closed by prosecutors. In January 2000, a prosecutor wrote to the Jewish plaintiffs explaining that the case was closed because: Russian nationalism should not be looked upon negatively; Mr. Korchagin was only trying to explain the role of Jews in history; and four "experts" had examined his writings and found nothing in them that violated the law against inciting ethnic hatred. The plaintiffs then appealed this decision to a higher court, which reopened the case. However, the plaintiffs are not confident that they will win a conviction.

When the publisher of the virulently antisemitic St. Petersburg newspaper *Nashe otechestvo* was brought to trial, the proceedings quickly degenerated into a farce:

The publisher of the raving-mad antisemitic newspaper *Nashe otechestvo* (Saint Petersburg) was also called to court. And also with the participation of an expert. On the prosecutor's invitation, a worker at the Pushkin House, Begunov, was that expert, and he intelligibly explained to the court that 'kike' is a totally academic term, and the infamous forgery, 'The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,' is inarguably a legitimate document.

The case against the publisher was closed.¹⁵

In October 2001, FEOR's newsletter reported that:

In May, the Russian Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) filed a criminal complaint against [Boris] Mironov, based on his violation of clause 282 of the Russian Penal Code, 'Incitement of International Dissent.' In the preface to a Russian translation of a book by David Duke, 'My Awakening on the Jewish Question' (Covington, Free Speech Press, 2001) Mironov calls the Jews 'a source of evil' and 'a Colorado beetle that destroys the origins of our Motherland.'

The complaint was rejected, as the Office of Public Prosecutor in Lefortovo (Moscow) did not find anything illegal in the book, even though the preface clearly violated part 1 of the clause, and denied the Russian Jewish Congress and the ADL the option of instituting legal proceedings.

Following his acquittal, Boris Mironov gained martyr status among his followers for refusing to 'renounce his

credo, which is so dangerous in Yid-enslaved Russia.’¹⁶

There are some exceptions to this rule. In 1999, Moscow city became the first of a handful of regions to ban the RNU outright. In February 1999, *Izvestiya* reported that the Prosecutor’s Office of Vologda brought criminal charges of inciting ethnic hatred against Vladimir Popov, the editor of the antisemitic newspaper *Slavyanin* (Slav). Mr. Popov has since the early 1990s publicly called for struggle against “Zionists” at meetings in the city. While the outcome of this case is not known, at the time of writing the newspaper is still being published and is as illegally antisemitic as ever. Finally, in June 2001 it was reported that a criminal case has been started against *Russkaya gazeta* in the Tula region and its production has been halted after it published an article entitled “Jewish Fascism” that clearly incited hatred against Jews.

CONCLUSION

What are the broader implications of the existence of these new forms of state antisemitism in Russia? Aside from the obvious dangers such policies pose for Russian Jews, there is the question of what this means for the fragile state of Russia’s economic and political stability and progress.

Writing in the early 1990s about antisemitism in Eastern Europe, Leon Volovici noted that:

[A]ntisemitism finds a place in the debate on tradition versus modernity, and on national isolationism versus openness and an entry into Europe... There are a number of signals used to evaluate the strength or the weakness of a society, the main trends in political culture and the efficient functioning of democratic institutions...

[A]ntisemitism and reactions to it represent one of the most important, for it touches on a number of essential elements in society: the collective mentality, national religious and historical fantasies [sic] and myths. Due to the complexity of the relationship between societies and their real or imaginary Jews, antisemitism can point to the degree of ‘moral health,’ the ‘obsessions’ of a society, and the tendencies of the public spirit.¹⁷

In other words, levels of antisemitism in Russia have a strong correlation with anti-democratic and anti-market sentiments, as well as a level of ethnic Russian nationalism that may imperil the still fragile, multi-ethnic structure of the Russian Federation.

Russia has made enormous progress in the past ten years vis a vis its Jewish population. However, there is much more that needs to be done before the overly optimistic proclamations of the past decade can truly be justified. A lot, of course, of what happens to Russian Jews is outside of the government’s control. The more stable Russia becomes economically and politically, the less need there will be for some to seek out traditional scapegoats.

Nevertheless, the government bears a strong measure of responsibility when it comes to the question of antisemitism. Rhetoric is good, but action is better. Rather than simply condemning antisemitism, it would be extremely helpful if President Putin would start condemning individual antisemitic politicians by name. In addition, a serious crackdown on hate groups, the passage of tougher anti-extremism legislation and a wide-ranging reform of the justice system to ensure that it enforces laws against the activities of hate groups would do wonders for the safety of Russia’s Jewish minority and the overall stability of his country.

ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX 2

- ¹ This essay was written by Nikolai Butkevich, UCSJ's Research and Advocacy Director.
- ² Quoted from a translation of the article on Russia Religious News, <http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/>.
- ³ *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, November 27, 2001; RTR television, November 20, 2001.
- ⁴ Russia has two competing Chief Rabbis—Adolf Shaevich and Beryl Lazar.
- ⁵ William Korey, "Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism," 14.
- ⁶ "Russian Regional Report," East-West Institute, Vol. 6, No. 45, December 19, 2001.
- ⁷ *Moskovskie novosti*, October 10-18, 1999.
- ⁸ *Delovoe Povolzhe*, October 20, 1999.
- ⁹ *Izvestiya*, May 6, 2000.
- ¹⁰ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines, January 26, 2001.
- ¹¹ *Obshchaya gazeta*, May 15, 1997.
- ¹² *Bryansky rabochy*, March 27, 1999.
- ¹³ RFE/RL (Un) Civil Societies, September 28, 2000.
- ¹⁴ "Monitoring Jewish Life in Russia: September 17-30," Newsletter of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia.
- ¹⁵ *Moskovsky komsomolets*, April 4, 2001.
- ¹⁶ "Monitoring Jewish Life in Russia: October 1-16, 2001," Newsletter of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia. The translation is FEOR's.
- ¹⁷ Leon Volovici, "Antisemitism in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: A Marginal or Central Issue?" Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism, Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1994, 22-23.

ABOUT THE UCSJ: UNION OF COUNCILS FOR JEWS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Founded in 1970 as an independent, grassroots Jewish and human rights advocacy and service organization, the UCSJ: Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union has a varied mandate and program of activities. In general, these fall into the following categories:

- UCSJ and its Member Councils provide briefings and policy advice to national and local government officials, including the Administration and the Congress, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), on events and issues related to Jews and human rights in the former Soviet Union. UCSJ leadership is regularly quoted and published in the general and Jewish media, requested to provide expert testimony before Congressional committees and political asylum adjudication hearings, and invited to consult with foreign policy officials and advisory committees in the National Security Council and Department of State. Through press releases and action alerts, UCSJ campaigns for political prisoners and victims of antisemitism, and advocates against discriminatory policies of FSU countries. It also publishes antisemitism and human rights status reports, based on its extensive monitoring network in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Its website, FSUMonitor.com, is updated daily with news stories.
- UCSJ coordinates a grassroots humanitarian aid and partnership program called Yad L'Yad (Hebrew for hand-to-hand), operated primarily through its Member Councils and their participating synagogues and Jewish day and religious schools. The American groups are partnered with Jewish communities and institutions - synagogues, Hebrew day and religious schools and service organizations - providing kosher meals to the elderly and shut-ins, medical supplies, Yiddishkeit, and educational assistance. Currently, over 90 such partnerships exist.
- UCSJ was the first (1990) Western Jewish or human rights organization to establish and register an office on Soviet soil with the creation, in Moscow, of the Soviet (now Russian)-American Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law. Today, UCSJ also operates monitoring Bureaus in St. Petersburg (through UCSJ's affiliated Member Council, the Bay Area Council for Jewish Rescue and Renewal), L'viv, Bishkek, Almaty, Tbilisi, Riga and Minsk. It also supports the Moscow-based Central Asia Human Rights Information Network. The eight Bureaus provide centers for advice on emigration, work collegially with other indigenous Jewish and human rights NGOs, and concentrate on the monitoring of antisemitism and neo-fascism.

UCSJ BOARD OF DIRECTORS, MEMBER COUNCILS, INTERNATIONAL BUREAUS, AFFILIATES, US AND FSU-BASED STAFF

UCSJ BOARD OF DIRECTORS

OFFICERS

YOSEF I. ABRAMOWITZ, PRESIDENT
MICAH H. NAFTALIN, NATIONAL DIRECTOR
SANDY CANTOR, VICE-PRESIDENT
JUNE DANIELS, VICE-PRESIDENT
MARILLYN TALLMAN, VICE-PRESIDENT
LAWRENCE LERNER, VICE-PRESIDENT/TREASURER

MEMBERS

RABBI STUART ALTSHULER	RABBI FELIPE
RUDY APPEL	GOODMAN
BUFFY BEAUDOIN- SCHWARTZ	GENYA INTRATOR
RABBI STEVE BOB	PNINA LEVERMORE
HINDA CANTOR	JUDY PATKIN
PHILIPPE CAPELLE	JOEL SANDBERG
PAMELA BRAUN COHEN*	SHARYN SCHNEIDER
SI FRUMKIN*	EVA SELIGMAN- KENNARD
SUSAN FUTTERMAN	CINDY SINGER
SHEILA GALLAND	LYNN SINGER*
RICHARD GEDULDIG	GREG SMITH
SHIRLEY GOLDSTEIN	SANDRA SPINNER

* DENOTES PAST PRESIDENTS

UCSJ MEMBER COUNCILS

ACTION FOR POST-SOVIET JEWRY (BOSTON)
BAY AREA COUNCIL FOR JEWISH RESCUE & RENEWAL
CHICAGO ACTION FOR JEWS IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION
CINCINNATI COUNCIL FOR POST-SOVIET JEWS
CLEVELAND COUNCIL ON SOVIET ANTISEMITISM
FLORIDA ACTION FOR JEWS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
GREAT NECK COMMITTEE FOR SOVIET JEWRY
LONG ISLAND COMMITTEE FOR SOVIET JEWRY
LOS ALAMOS COMMITTEE ON SOVIET ANTISEMITISM
OMAHA COMMITTEE FOR SOVIET JEWRY

UCSJ INTERNATIONAL BUREAUS

BALTIC-AMERICAN BUREAU ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW
BELARUS-AMERICAN BUREAU ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW
CAUCASUS-AMERICAN BUREAU ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW
CENTRAL ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION NETWORK (MOSCOW)
HAROLD AND SELMA LIGHT JEWISH CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(ST. PETERSBURG)
KAZAKHSTAN INTERNATIONAL BUREAU ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
RULE OF LAW
KYRGYZSTAN-AMERICAN BUREAU ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE
OF LAW
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN BUREAU ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW
UKRAINIAN-AMERICAN BUREAU ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

UCSJ AFFILIATES


AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF JEWS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION
BRIDGES, AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE LVIV ARCHIVE
THE CAUCASUS NETWORK
THE CENTER FOR RUSSIAN JEWRY
THE CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY
INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS' COMMISSION
NEW SOUTH WALES JEWISH BOARD OF DEPUTIES
SOVIET JEWRY COMMITTEE OF OSLO
STUDENT STRUGGLE FOR SOVIET JEWRY
35'S WOMEN'S CAMPAIGN FOR SOVIET JEWRY (LONDON)

UCSJ STAFF – U.S. BASED

MICAH NAFTALIN, NATIONAL DIRECTOR
LEONID STONOV, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL BUREAUS AND
ACTIVITIES
ABDUMANNOB POLAT, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL ASIAN HUMAN
RIGHTS INFORMATION NETWORK (CAHRIN)
NICKOLAI BUTKEVICH, RESEARCH & ADVOCACY DIRECTOR
LINDA GORDON KUZMACK, DIRECTOR OF DEVELOPMENT
SARAH BROWN, OFFICE MANAGER
NORMA SKEETE, FINANCIAL OFFICER

UCSJ STAFF – INTERNATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS

NATALYA ABLOVA, BISHKEK	ALEXANDER BROD, MOSCOW
MIKHAIL AVRUTIN, RIGA	LEONID LVOV, ST. PETERSBURG
YAKOV BASIN, MINSK	MEYLAKH G. SHEYKHET, LVIV
RABBI ARIEL LEVINE, TBILISI	EVGENY ZHOVTIS, ALMATY



Antisemitic leaflet from Krasnodar



UCSJ: Union of Councils for Jews in the FSU

1819 H St., N.W., Suite 230, Washington, DC 20006

Tel: (202) 775-9770 ✦ Fax: (202) 775-9776

Email: ucsj@ucsj.com ✦ Web: <http://www.FSUMonitor.com>