

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Hatred exists everywhere, but there are few places where the assortment of hatred is as broad as it is in our country. There are few places where society is so indifferent to it. In Germany each skinhead attack on Turks, Kurds or Jews becomes a matter of great alarm for the police and thousands-strong public demonstrations against extremism and xenophobia. In our country such things do not provoke a very notable reaction, but what is noticeable are the consequences.**

*Izvestiya, November 10, 2001*

**We cannot fail to be put on our guard by the fact that the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Federal Security Service, and the Prosecutor's Office have still not really tried to combat nationalism or political extremism, attributing their stance to the lack of a special law. As if we do not have a Constitution, a Criminal Code, a Criminal Procedure Code, or laws on social associations, security, and the police. As if it is impossible not only to instigate criminal proceedings on article 282 of the Criminal Code (ethnic, racial, and religious hatred) but to also bring them to court. In fact we must now talk not only about creating a new law, which could once again be stillborn, but also about the political will of the authorities themselves. Or else it will already be too late to combat the nationalists.**

*Nezavisimaya gazeta, July 5, 2001.*

Antisemitism, xenophobia and religious persecution, from both official and grassroots sources, continued to threaten the safety of ethnic and religious minorities throughout Russia in 2001. From Kaliningrad in the far west to the Pacific port city of Vladivostok, from the Arctic city of Murmansk to the southern resort area of Krasnodar, regional authorities as a general rule ignore the activities of dangerous hate groups who aim violent rhetoric and actions against minority groups, refusing to prosecute hate crimes or, at best, classifying them under the euphemistic term "hooliganism." These hate groups range from skinhead gangs and other neo-Nazi organizations like the People's National Party to officially approved paramilitary Cossack formations. With some exceptions, federal authorities have failed to take strong, consistent action to crack down on hate groups or against politicians who illegally incite ethnic or religious hatred, preferring to engage in positive rhetoric and symbolism rather than action. While there have been improvements in the way officials react to antisemitic incidents as compared to previous years, official reaction is on a whole still disturbingly weak. Worst of all, after a welcome decline in antisemitic incidents in 2000, the summer and early fall of 2001 witnessed a rash of beatings of Jews (Moscow, Orenburg, Kostroma and Omsk) and arson attacks on Jewish property (Ryazan, Kostroma, Kazan), none of which have been solved. The vast majority of past antisemitic attacks—the synagogue bombings in Moscow in 1999, the attack on a Jewish school in Ryazan in 2000, and numerous other incidents—have remained unsolved. Unless otherwise noted, none of the numerous incidents of violence, vandalism and illegal hate speech documented in this report have resulted in any arrests.

President Vladimir Putin continues to make positive gestures towards Russia's Jewish community by attending major Jewish events, praising the role of Jews in Russia's history and contemporary life,

and strongly condemning antisemitism. In many regions, it is no longer uncommon to see a mayor or governor visit a synagogue or congratulate the community on a holiday. These official gestures have helped to create a more confident climate for Jews in Russia, spurring a continued renaissance of Jewish life in Russia, as evidenced by the growing number of synagogues being returned to the community after decades of government ownership, the increasing media coverage of Jewish communal activities and statements by Jewish leaders about domestic and international events, and a rising willingness of Jewish leaders in some parts of the country to stand up publicly for their rights.

Yet under the veneer of stability and justifiable celebration of the amazing achievements of the past decade, there remains a sense of unease. In part, this feeling is unavoidable no matter what the current circumstances are, given the dark history of antisemitism in Russia and doubts about the country's long term stability and prosperity. Despite two years of economic growth (the first substantial rise in GDP since the collapse of the Soviet Union) and political stability under President Putin, most independent economists question the long-term viability of Russia's economic recovery. Most Russians still live in poverty, the country's population continues to plunge at an alarming rate, equipment and infrastructure are crumbling after years of neglect, and the economy remains dangerously dependent on historically volatile world oil prices. Russian Jews know that they are the favorite scapegoats of many demagogic politicians whose popularity may rise suddenly in the face of another economic collapse like the August 1998 crash, which as UCSJ documented in past reports, led to a sharp rise in antisemitic incidents in 1998-99.

Even if present economic and political trends continue and Russia remains stable, there are other reasons to worry. Russian Jewish leaders' frequent assertions that "there is no state antisemitism in Russia" are only partially correct. While it is certainly true that the active promotion of antisemitism is no longer state policy, as it was throughout much of the Soviet period, passive state antisemitism persists. Although there has been some improvement in federal prosecutors' enforcement of laws against the incitement of ethnic hatred, as a rule they fail to properly apply these laws or ensure that regional prosecutors do, sending a message to antisemites that their actions will likely go unpunished. Far too much latitude has been granted to regional officials in how they react to the activities of hate groups or extremist politicians, leaving many to choose to take no action at all to protect local minorities. In a November 2001 meeting with regional police officials, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Chekalin admitted as much when he stated: "We have gone too far in our inaction against extremist youth."<sup>1</sup> The consequences of this permissive attitude towards hate groups are especially clear in Moscow, where for years police ignored skinhead attacks against foreign students, dark-skinned market traders, and even diplomats from African and Asian countries. Only now, when the problem has become so acute that skinhead violence is almost a daily event in Moscow, have the city authorities begun to take the skinhead problem seriously. Unfortunately, it may be too late to contain the growth of skinhead groups, which have increased their membership and geographical scope to a stunning degree. In addition, while there are some signs of improvement, cases of police idly watching as skinheads beat ethnic and religious minorities, or even engaging in such violence themselves, continue to be reported throughout the country. Speaking to a Russian reporter at the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Durban in September 2001, Aleksandr Verkhovsky of the "Panorama" think tank—a leading authority on extremist groups in Russia—stated the problem succinctly: "Extremist pro-Nazi paramilitary organizations propagandizing the ideas of racial hatred operate openly in Russia, and the state does nothing to prevent this."<sup>2</sup>

With a few exceptions, police in Moscow and other cities did nothing in the face of regular antisemitic demonstrations by neo-Nazis, Communists and Russian Orthodox fundamentalists. These demonstrations ranged in size from a couple of dozen to several thousand participants. Even the smaller demonstrations are impressive if viewed within the context of widespread political apathy and cynicism in Russia today—readers of this report’s descriptions of antisemitic demonstrations should keep in mind that anti-fascist or pro-democracy demonstrations in Russia are much less frequent and tend to be even smaller. As Vladimir Pribylovsky, a leading expert on Russian extremists, put it: “It isn’t terrible when 3% of a country is made up of extremist groups, what’s terrible is when nobody stands against them.”<sup>3</sup>

This trend of passive state antisemitism and racism is even more apparent in the judicial branch, where there are numerous examples of judges refusing to punish antisemites and other extremists, even when they have clearly violated the law. While the justice system tends to come down hard on even minor offenses, antisemitic and racist violence is often treated with kid gloves. According to a *Nezavisimaya gazeta* article: “For stealing a chicken, you can get eight years, but for a pogrom, several months.”<sup>2</sup> Nor have prosecutors, judges, or federal and regional officials in charge of regulating the media dealt effectively with the dozens of antisemitic and racist newspapers published throughout the country, in blatant violation of the law.

Finally, the State Duma remains a hotbed of antisemitism and racism, especially among deputies from the KPRF and the LDPR. State Duma deputies from Bryansk and Krasnodar Kray regularly violate laws against public hate speech, as does Deputy Speaker of the State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. In 2001, hate literature was openly sold in the State Duma, including David Duke’s “The Jewish Question Through the Eyes of an American” and several antisemitic newspapers.

On the regional level, President Putin has made some progress in his efforts to reverse years of radical decentralization under the Yeltsin administration. Many regional laws have been brought into accordance with federal legislation, secessionist movements that threatened the integrity of the Russian Federation have been successfully undercut (with the obvious exception of Chechnya), significant sources of revenue have been redirected from the regions to the center, and the central government has achieved the right to remove governors who go too far in abusing the law. However, despite the appearance of strength, the central government remains weak, and this weakness, when combined with the indifference of many central government officials to the problems of antisemitism, racism, religious persecution and other human rights violations, has helped create a system of government in which regional leaders make some basic concessions to the Kremlin in return for the right to treat their citizens almost any way they choose. As a result, minority groups are treated differently from region to region, largely at the whim of the local bosses. The Jewish community is a case in point: In a few extreme cases they are demonized by regional leaders (Kursk, Krasnodar) or by media controlled by the regional administration (Vladimir, Oryol, Bryansk), in a few more their concerns are taken very seriously (the Moscow city administration being the most obvious and important example), while in the bulk of Russia’s regions, the authorities neither attack nor adequately defend Jews against grassroots antisemitic violence. In a prime example of collaboration between hate groups and regional authorities, in at least four regions (Ryazan, Voronezh, Tver, Republic of Mari-El), local newspapers reported that a successor organization to the violent neo-Nazi organization Russian National Unity (RNU) called “Russian Rebirth” was officially registered in 2001—two years after Russia’s most infamous hate group was banned in Moscow. The RNU was included on public councils attached to government bodies in Bryansk and Saratov. Despite the split

within the RNU, it and similar groups remain strong in some provincial cities. In late December 2001, a Jewish leader from Borovichi gave a possible reason for the persistence of these hate groups:

Small cities today are of special interest to leaders of extremist organizations, since the low level of life, the low education level of the population and the large fall in the economy and the difficult material situation of residents of these cities are all potential soil for new members.<sup>5</sup>

While some measure of re-centralization is obviously needed after the decay of state authority throughout the 1990s, the manner in which President Putin is tackling the problem of the central government's weakness shows an alarming tendency on his part to focus more on the levers of power than on the rule of law. Jews and all other citizens of Russia will never be truly safe until a democratic, law-based system develops, yet Russia under Putin seems to be sliding more and more towards authoritarianism.

A new, disturbing trend that emerged in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US is the radicalization of some of Russia's Islamic community. A few Russian Muslim leaders, most but not all of them self-proclaimed, publicly repeated the radical Islamist canard that Israel secretly planned the September 11 attacks. Rallies in support of the Taliban and the Palestinian Authority have taken place in some predominantly Muslim regions. So far, such opinions are shared by a small minority of Russian Muslims and are for the most part concentrated in Chechnya and Dagestan, yet this is obviously a growing trend that requires continued monitoring.

Other ethnic and religious minorities continue to be subjected to violence and intimidation, both from official and grassroots actors. Chechens and other so-called "people of Caucasian nationality"—a widely used racist term used to describe people from the Caucasus, millions of whom live in Russia—continue to be subjected to police shakedowns and skinhead attacks in almost every region and city. Dark-skinned foreign students, tens of thousands of whom reside in Russia, are constantly beaten by skinheads and, with a few exceptions, police do nothing to defend them. Meskhetian Turks, Armenians and other groups are targeted by an official policy of racism in Krasnodar Kray, where officials deny them the most basic rights and empower Cossack paramilitary groups to beat and harass them. Krasnodar Kray is the most extreme example of the problem of vigilante Cossack formations; most Russian cities now have such groups, many of which are explicitly racist, working in cooperation with police or as private security guards. A March 2001 *Izvestiya* article reported that there are around 700 officially registered Cossack organizations in the country.<sup>6</sup> A report from Yekaterinburg, one of Russia's most crime-ridden cities, explains why this dangerous trend has evolved—there are simply not enough public resources to pay for the necessary number of police to keep crime in check, necessitating cooperation with unofficial paramilitary groups:

At the present time, the [Sverdlovsk Oblast] GUVD [Department of Internal Affairs] is understaffed by almost 20%. In the capital of the Urals [Yekaterinburg], 350 police officers keep order on the streets instead of the 1,000 that are needed. In order to stabilize the situation, the police propose to invite the cooperation in the maintenance of order of members of *druzhiny* [a Soviet era neighborhood watch group] and Cossack formations.<sup>7</sup>

All in all, when it comes to racism, there has been no improvement of the climate in Russia, instead the situation has gotten noticeably worse. One of Russia's leading pollsters—Yuri Levada—revealed in December 2001 that around 40% of Russians believe that non-Russians are bad people.<sup>8</sup> Despairing of police protection, many targeted minority groups, some of whom are quite numerous, are beginning to form self-defense groups, raising the terrifying specter of future ethnic conflicts possibly breaking out in Russia.

As in past years, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) constantly whips up hysteria about minority Christians, labeling them “totalitarian sects” and even tools of foreign intelligence agencies bent on breaking apart Russia in a “spiritual attack.” The ROC remains a bastion of extreme anti-Western views, as was shown in December 2000 when Patriarch Alexi II accused the West of waging “a well planned, bloodless war... against our people, aimed at exterminating them.”<sup>9</sup> These extremist views are often reflected back onto minority Christian groups, who are seen as somehow “non-Russian” or “Western” despite the historical presence of many of these faiths in Russia. In some regions, local authorities collaborate with the ROC by denying minority Christians registration or by demonizing them in the local press. In full view of a thunderstruck foreign press corps, the Moscow city authorities tried to disband the Salvation Army and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, though they were ultimately unsuccessful. In October 2001, Mikhail Odintsev—chief of the Department on Religious and National Questions for the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation—reported that over the course of 2000-2001, his office received around 1,000 complaints from people of various religious faiths about the refusal of authorities to register or reregister them, as well as other forms of official harassment.<sup>10</sup> In addition, grass-roots violence remains a serious problem. In an interview in late 2001, Ludmila Alekseeva of the Moscow Helsinki Group related the conclusions of experts at a November 29, 2001 roundtable on religious freedom:

Pchelintsev and Kalin [prominent religious freedom advocates] spoke about the growing number of attacks on believers, including Pentecostals, Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses. People are beaten and threats are made, for the most part these attacks are made by law enforcement officers. Speakers produced specific cases and they named the people who were beaten, some of whom were clergy of these churches and some simple parishioners. They say that this began soon after the adoption of the 1997 law [on religion] and that every year such cases have increased, which is especially alarming.<sup>11</sup>

“Islamophobia” remains widespread, reflected in the opposition by some regional authorities to the building of mosques (Taganrog, Murmansk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other cities) and the tendency of much of the Russian press to equate Islam with terrorism, without taking into account the diversity of the Islamic faith. The war in Chechnya drags on, brutalizing and radicalizing Chechen civilians and creating a whole generation of rabidly racist Russian soldiers and policemen. Like the Jews, treatment of minority Christians and Muslims varies from region to region, largely dependant on the whims of the local authorities.

At the same time, there has been some improvement in the situation of minority Christians—several congregations won court cases against regional authorities who were trying to disband them. Perhaps out of fear of defamation law suits, federal and regional officials, along with hostile elements within the ROC and the media, have more and more begun using the generic term of “sect” rather than specifically attacking Baptists, Pentecostals or some other minority Christians. While this trend does not represent any lessening of the climate of hostility, it does perhaps reflect a growing ability of some minority Christians to be able to defend themselves through legal means. The two big exceptions to this rule are the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons, who are constantly attacked by name.

It is our profound hope that, given the positive rhetoric of President Putin and some other officials in his government, this report will be used as a roadmap of sorts for addressing the crucial problems of antisemitism, xenophobia and religious persecution. Region by region, we have meticulously documented hate crimes and the reactions, or lack of reactions, of local officials to these crimes in the hope of aiding the central government to crack down on hate groups, illegal hate speech and extrem-

ist politicians, and just as importantly, to discipline lax officials. The reception of our last report—which officials and the national press met with a variety of responses, from praise to angry denial—leaves us with a feeling of cautious optimism that the disturbing incidents documented in this report will receive the serious examination they deserve. In the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup>, it is clear that comprehensive monitoring of antisemitism and other forms of hate are more crucial than ever because of the nexus between xenophobia and terrorism. The monitoring of these phenomena in Russia give those who are interested in improving political, social and economic conditions there a useful indicator of the state of civil society, ethnic relations, rule of law, and political stability.

Micah H. Naftalin  
National Director

Aleksandr Brod  
Moscow Bureau Chief

Nickolai Butkevich  
Editor

#### ENDNOTES FOR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- <sup>1</sup> Strana.ru, November 15, 2001.
- <sup>2</sup> *Izvestiya*, September 1, 2001.
- <sup>3</sup> *Moskovsky komsomolets*, November 13, 2001.
- <sup>4</sup> *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 22, 2001.
- <sup>5</sup> “Prava cheloveka,” Radio Svoboda, December 26, 2001.
- <sup>6</sup> *Izvestiya*, March 3, 2001.
- <sup>7</sup> www.ntv.ru, December 7, 2001.
- <sup>8</sup> IMA-press news agency, December 14, 2001.
- <sup>9</sup> Interfax, December 15, 2000.
- <sup>10</sup> Blagovest-Info news agency, October 29, 2001.
- <sup>11</sup> *Nezavisimaya gazeta—religii*, December 11, 2001.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### *For the Russian Government:*

- Through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service (FSB), vigorously investigate and prosecute antisemitic and extremist organizations and individuals, and incidents of hate crimes. Redirect FSB resources currently being used to investigate and prosecute religious minorities, environmental scientists, and human rights NGOs to the crucial task of fighting extremism.
- Dismiss Russian federal officials in regional and/or municipal offices who collaborate with, or are tolerant of, extremist groups and individuals.
- Provide effective police protection to endangered Jewish and other minority religious and community sites.
- Repudiate the 1997 law on religion and introduce legislation in the Duma to restore full freedom of religion in Russia.
- Undertake reform of the police, prosecutors and courts to promote rule of law as a primary value in Russian political culture.
- Press regional leaders to appoint local human rights ombudsmen. Ensure that the officials chosen truly believe in human rights. The President should meet regularly with the Human Rights Ombudsman.

### *For the United States Government:*

- Keep channels of communications open between US government officials and human rights and Jewish organizations and urge the Russian side to seek similar consultations from its NGO community.
- Place human rights, religious freedom and antisemitism issues routinely on the agenda for bi-lateral meetings between Russia and the United States.
- Urge the Russian government to take legal action against antisemitic extremist groups and individuals, encourage the State Duma to repudiate the 1997 law on religion.
- Maintain and expand United States assistance programs in the area of civil society, democracy, human rights, rule of law and religious freedom, with special emphasis on grassroots monitoring and advocacy.
- Continue to provide a strong humanitarian response to the problem of refugees in the former Soviet Union—including vulnerable religious minorities like Jews and Evangelical Christians—through a generous US refugee admissions program.
- Support the inclusion of strong human rights considerations in guidelines for the approval of new loans or other forms of bi-lateral and multi-lateral assistance.



## **SOUTHERN FEDERAL DISTRICT**

Krasnodar Kray  
Republic of Adygea  
Republic of Chechnya  
Republic of Dagestan  
Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya  
Republic of North Ossetia/Alania  
Rostov Oblast  
Stavropol Kray  
Volgograd Oblast

**SOUTHERN FEDERAL DISTRICT****KRASNODAR KRAY***Highlights from the Previous Report*

Then Governor Nikolai Kondratenko continually incited hatred against Jews and other minority groups. Despite his illegal hate speech, he was awarded a medal by President Putin for “Service to the Fatherland,” a decision criticized by the US Department of State in an October 3, 2000 statement condemning Kremlin support for Governor Kondratenko. Cossacks used their wide-ranging police powers to terrorize ethnic minorities, and many local Cossack leaders, some of whom are openly antisemitic, held politically influential positions in the regional government. The regional government severely discriminated against Meskhetian Turks and there were reports of official discrimination against Armenians and other groups. The local RNU held weekly demonstrations in the city of Krasnodar and a branch of the Black Hundreds was active in the region. The FSB in Novorossiysk persecuted local anti-fascists. Krasnodar remained a major center for the publication of pseudo-academic antisemitic books, especially those produced by the Sovetskaya Kuban publishing house. One such book was advertised for sale in the official newspaper of the regional administration—*Kubanskije novosti*. At least three antisemitic newspapers were published in the region—*Kuban lesnaya*, *Vesti slavyan Yuga Rossii*, and *Za Rus!*. Local Protestants were unable to rent space to worship on Sundays, and instead had to meet in a three room apartment and video tape the services for others to use. Jehovah’s Witnesses faced similar restrictions. A local television station aired a program characterizing Mormons as spies. A Buddhist center was refused registration.

*Official Antisemitism*

The surprise decision of the wildly popular governor of Krasnodar Nikolai Kondratenko not to run for re-election at the end of 2000 led to a changing of the guard in the region’s top leadership. Governor Kondratenko’s chosen successor—Aleksandr Tkachyov—easily won the election, and immediately appointed Mr. Kondratenko to represent the region in the Federation Council—the upper house of the Russian parliament. This official post grants Mr. Kondratenko immunity from criminal prosecution, which he constantly abuses in order to continue his illegal incitement of hatred against Jews and other minority groups. Unlike his predecessor, Governor Tkachyov does not publicly espouse antisemitic beliefs—a welcome improvement. However, he has not distanced himself from fellow members of the local party of power (“Fatherland-Kondratenko”) who continue to incite hatred against Jews, and has nothing but praise for the former governor.

Former governor Kondratenko used the bully pulpit of the Federation Council to incite hatred of Jews and other minorities throughout 2001. In late June 2001, he made the following statement in reaction to news that former Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic had been extradited to the Hague on war crimes charges:

I propose we formulate an official statement in defense of Milosevic. He is the victim of tyranny. Some people bombed the country and now those who did it are to judge a president who tried to defend his country. This is a disgrace for the so-called world community. This is nothing but dirty Zionist activity. The world Zionist government is trying in this way to deal with those who dare to have a voice in this godforsaken world.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Kondratenko is one of Mr. Milosevic's most ardent defenders in Russia and has made trips to Yugoslavia to express his solidarity with him. Continuing his support for the genocidal Yugoslav ex-leader, Mr. Kondratenko accompanied Borislav Milosevic—Slobodan's brother and former ambassador to Russia—on a trip to Krasnodar. During the trip, Mr. Milosevic publicly referred to Mr. Kondratenko as his "old friend."<sup>2</sup>

In July 2001, during a debate over a controversial bill to allow for the importation of nuclear waste to Russia, Mr. Kondratenko managed to connect the issue to the Jews, arguing: "Let the Zionists send their children to the inferno, we, the Russians, want to live."<sup>3</sup> Both this and his earlier statement about Mr. Milosevic were broadcast on national television.

In August 2001, Mr. Kondratenko gave an interview to the official newspaper of the State Duma during which he once again attacked Jews:

Today, only the stupid or the evil-doers—those who created this problem—don't want to see the problem of Russians in Russia. Is it really normal when Russians are literally driven out of the ruling structures of Russia? Can you name me a Russian by birth and tribe, not by passport, among the leaders of the leading media organs? And if you name me a Russian among the top levels of finance, you'll win first prize... Speaking at parliamentary hearings in the Duma on the bill "On the Russian People," I convinced my opponents that we, the Russians, are already a long way from chauvinism. In our self-identity we already long ago have agreed that we are not the masters of our country and that they should [instead] be afraid of Spanish, Portuguese, German or Austrian antisemitism... In a critical situation we, the Russians, gathering our last amount of strength, will save the Jews from the blows of fate, thus fulfilling our historical role, like in 1941-1945 when our fathers and grandfathers, at the price of their own lives, pulled them out of the ovens of Auschwitz and Buchenwald.<sup>4</sup>

In October 2001, after apparently taking the month of September off from his personal "struggle against Zionism," Mr. Kondratenko got fired up by a debate over a measure to legalize the sale of some land in Russia and was quoted as saying:

We sold the finances of Russia, the industries and the informational structures that confuse the consciousness of people. There are no Russians there at all. Who will acquire property in our region? The Armenians, the Jews and the Meskhetian Turks. Russians and the native peoples of Russia cannot afford it!<sup>5</sup>

He hit this theme again in a speech in the Federation Council:

We already have sold a lot. We sold the factories, the finances, the banks, and the media into private hands. Take a look, have many Russians bought these? There are practically no Russians or other native peoples there. We don't have the money to acquire land. We will sell to alien peoples. You know what I'm talking about. Russians can't pay today. The mountain peoples today still keep these processes under their control. Russians can't do anything—they would immediately be accused of nationalism. I cannot, friends, vote for this law!<sup>6</sup>

By then, Mr. Kondratenko's constant antisemitic and racist statements at long last brought some criticism from his colleagues in the upper house of the parliament. In October 2001, the new representative to the Federation Council from Moscow—Vladimir Plotnikov—accused Mr. Kondratenko of "chauvinism" adding that he is personally not used to hearing the kind of statements that Mr. Kondratenko regularly makes.<sup>7</sup> More heavyweight criticism came in December 2001 from the newly elected chairman of the Federation Council—Sergey Mironov. In an interview with Mr. Mironov broadcast on RTR television, host Nikolai Svanidze and his guest had the following exchange about Mr. Kondratenko:

Mr. Svanidze: Among the members of the Federation Council there is an open racist and fascist named Kondratenko. I am interested in your reaction to this fact.

Mr. Mironov: Mr. Kondratenko in one of the most recent sessions allowed himself to make very disrespectful comments about various nationalities in our Russian Federation. Members of the Federation Council gathered and there was even a special declaration sent personally to your humble servant and my colleague Oganyan from members of the Federation Council on the question of inter-ethnic relations and on the unacceptability of such public statements by members of the upper house of the Russian Federation. Such a draft declaration has been prepared, it is now being studied in the appropriate committee. At the very least, many colleagues demanded an apology from Kondratenko right in the meeting hall. Unfortunately, that didn't happen. But I once again want to say that I think that such statements are unacceptable in general, and especially within the walls of the Federation Council.<sup>8</sup>

A couple of weeks later, Governor Tkachyov was asked in an interview with the local newspaper *Kubanskije novosti* about this exchange:

Q: In a television program on national television, Kondratenko was recently called a “fascist.”

A: That is simply blasphemy. It was offensive to the hundreds of thousands of Krasnodar residents who know personally what Nikolai Ignatovich has done for Krasnodar.

Governor Tkachyov added that Mr. Kondratenko was “standing up for the interests of the region in the Federation Council.”<sup>9</sup> In May 2001, the governor said of Mr. Kondratenko:

Nikolai Ignatovich has been and remains for me a senior comrade. I highly value his service to Krasnodar. He even now is serving his home region faithfully and truthfully and standing up for our interests in the Federation Council... strategically, we think the same.<sup>10</sup>

Campaigning for a State Duma seat in the Tikhoretsk electoral district in a by-election set for May 20, 2001, Nikolai Denisov—a member of “Fatherland-Kondratenko” and a professor at the Kuban Academy of Culture—appealed to the antisemitic sentiment of voters. His only serious opponent was Tatyana Pavlovskaya—a local radio personality. The national newspaper *Kommersant* characterized the campaign in the following way:

A major scandal took place at the beginning of this week. At a meeting with voters, the right hand man of Nikolai Denisov, the professor and medical doctor Vladimir Onopriev, called Ms. Pavlovskaya a “kike” and a “destroyer of Russia.” Somebody at the meeting then reminded Mr. Onopriev that he had worked with Tatyana Pavlovskaya in the first democratic government of Krasnodar. The professor tenderly called him “yet another kike” and when the man fired back that he was “a political prostitute,” Mr. Onopriev got extremely upset and called the police.

Now the regional election committee is reviewing Ms. Pavlovskaya's complaint about the incitement of ethnic hatred. It should be noted that the campaign is taking place in an atmosphere of blatant antisemitism. As part of his election platform, Professor Denisov is distributing a brochure entitled “The Ideology of Conscious Opposition.” Within it, there are the following recommendations:

“A passionate social push should not to wait until 2003, but instead a state of emergency should be declared in the country. In coordination with the authorities, the state of emergency could inspire nationwide actions of civil disobedience, announce a month-long campaign to cleanse the upper and lower levels, and then... free the government, the Presidential Administration and the media from the dominant influence of the Jews and formulate a cadre to fill federal structures.”

One can only guess which authorities this appeal is addressed to. In a television commercial, the member of the Federation Council Nikolai Kondratenko, despite the law on elections, campaigns for candidate Denisov. Papa

Kondrat is an unquestionable authority in Krasnodar.<sup>11</sup>

At another campaign stop, Mr. Onopriev reportedly said in a speech that: “Putin is a fool, but Denisov has been sent by God, and therefore we must vote for him unanimously. The government is full of kikes and through the sugar refinery they are draining the brains of the children of the Novopokrovsky District and have organized a sweet life for themselves.”<sup>12</sup>

Mr. Denisov won the election with 58.8% of the vote. Reacting to this illegal hate speech, Ms. Pavlovskaya’s campaign filed a complaint with the local elections commission, but without any results. One of her assistants told a newspaper that: “As far as we know, Denisov wasn’t even warned.”<sup>13</sup> After Ms. Pavlovskaya and another former candidate—Marina Meshcheryakova—held a post-election press conference charging irregularities in the conduct of Mr. Denisov’s campaign, Ms. Meshcheryakova had her bank account frozen, was arrested (supposedly to question her about a license of some sort), held in a detention cell with a career female criminal who beat her up, and was only released after eight days.<sup>14</sup>

In October 2001, a party congress of the “Fatherland-Kondratenko” movement was held featuring racist, antisemitic and anti-government speeches. Governor Tkachyov was quoted as saying: “The main people in the Kuban [Krasnodar] are the Russian people, and all those who come to us should adapt themselves to us, to our ways and traditions, and think about us. And those who come today—you’ve stayed for a while. Enough! Time to go home—to Turkey, Georgia, and so on.”

The official newspaper of the regional administration—*Kubanskije novosti*—on October 31, 2001 printed the texts of the key note speeches given at the congress. Governor Tkachyov in his written speech warned that if the central government doesn’t do something about the migration problem “then we ourselves in the kray will, no matter what laws are violated, take decisive measures and drive out all the aliens (*inogorodtsy*).” He was also quoted as warning President Putin that if a controversial Land Code is implemented in the region, there would be a popular revolt.

In his speech, the just elected State Duma deputy Nikolai Denisov stated that: “[I]t looks as if the Zionist-American new world order has now entered a new phase of its development. The 10-year period of... oppression of the former republics of the Soviet Union by the G-7 is now being complemented by the physical extermination of compatriots by means of unleashing a third world war.” *Kubanskije novosti* printed the text of his speech as well, in which he demanded that laws be passed ensuring that the central government is made up of ethnic groups “proportional to the ethnic composition of the country’s population” (in other words, there are too many Jews and other non-Russians are in power). He also called for a Nuremburg trial for those who broke up the USSR. Ironically, Mr. Kondratenko apparently said nothing antisemitic or racist at the gathering.<sup>15</sup>

Immediately after the NTV broadcast, *Kubanskije novosti* ran an article denying that the governor had threatened the government with a popular revolt and alleging that NTV was trying to create a conflict between President Putin and the governor. In an amazing twist of logic, the article accused NTV of inciting ethnic hatred, totally ignoring the fact that *Kubanskije novosti*’s printed version of the officials’ speeches clearly show that it was they, not NTV, that were guilty whipping up hysteria against various ethnic groups.<sup>16</sup>

The newspaper *Kubanskije novosti*—the official newspaper of the regional administration—continued to indirectly approve of antisemitism, though less frequently than under Governor Kondratenko.

In a typical example, using bland language that strongly suggested he was covering a normal, mainstream political party rather than a meeting by one of Russia's most extreme antisemitic groups, journalist Sergey Perov of *Kubanskije novosti* reported a press conference by Vladimir Miloserdov's Russia Party in February 2001 using the following words (the article is translated here in full):

In Krasnodar a press conference was organized by the Chairman of the Russian party, a Professor of Technical Science and Lieutenant in the Army Reserve, V. Miloserdov. Today this political party is the single Russian national organization registered in the Ministry of Justice as an All-Russian political party.

The Russian party considers its closest strategic aim the salvation of the Russian people: Great Russians, Little Russians, White Russians, and other native ethnicities and tribes that strive for the rebirth of Great Russia. The party's platform calls for the return of stolen property to the people, the establishment of ethnic and social justice, and the payment of pensions and welfare, free education and healthcare.

According to Vladimir Miloserdov, the political situation in Russia makes it necessary to unify all patriotic forces in the country into one political party. At present, an organizing committee has been set up to create "The People's Patriotic Russian Party (NPPR)."

Miloserdov believes that a new party should be created on the basis of the 15,000 active political groupings in 65 regions of Russia. There are already over 1,000 members of the party in Krasnodar.

Further construction of the party, according to Miloserdov, will meet with resistance from the Communists and the democrats, who will be disturbed by the appearance on the political horizon of a powerful opponent—a new type of nationalist party whose social base is made up of, according to its leader, the entire Russian people.<sup>17</sup>

In July 2001, *Kubanskije novosti* published an announcement by representatives of a local branch of a new antisemitic party—the People's Patriotic Party of Russia. In addition to contact information, the article informed readers of the official paper of the regional administration that the Krasnodar region had always been "the symbol of uncompromising struggle against foreign invasions and the local comprador 'fifth' column inspired by cosmopolitans." "Cosmopolitan" is a Stalin-era official code word for Jew.

Another article appearing in the same issue described the party branch's founding congress in Krasnodar a few days before. Under the provocative title "Comrades! Grab a Switch and Drive the Television Fat-Bellies to Palestine!" the article reported in calm, neutral terms about the meeting, which was characterized by numerous antisemitic outbursts. A local organizer—Aleksandr Makovitsky—called for all "healthy patriotic forces" to struggle against "Zionist oligarchs." State Duma deputy Oleg Mashchenko and deputy of the regional legislature Viktor Protsko attended the meeting. Participants called for ex-Governor Kondratenko to lead the movement, and then used discussion time to talk about the best ways to free the country from "the Ziono-Masonic yoke"—that "historical enemy" of Russia that is supposedly using television to "zombify" Slavic children. Participants recommended that one way to fight World Zionism is not to watch television.<sup>18</sup>

### *Cossack Organizations*

Throughout 2001, Cossacks continued to terrorize ethnic minorities, especially Meskhetian Turks and Armenians. Many local Cossack leaders, some of whom are openly antisemitic, continue to have strong political influence in the government. According to a Cossack leader speaking at the end of 2000, 15,700 Kuban Cossacks are registered as soldiers in the region, and 283 Cossack paramilitary *druzhiny* with over 5,000 members operate in Krasnodar. These units conducted over 2,000 "raids" on unspecified targets in 2000, and uncovered 556 crimes. In addition, over 100 members of

the Kuban Cossack Host have been elected to public office in the region.<sup>19</sup> A February 2001 article in *Izvestiya* reported that there are over 30 Cossack organizations in Krasnodar Kray.<sup>20</sup>

In November 2000, Gennady Len—a local Cossack leader running for a seat on the Krasnodar city parliament—put out campaign literature bragging about how he was the first to protest about the Armenian government's plans to quietly occupy Krasnodar Kray, how he was able to put a stop to charter flights from Yerevan to Krasnodar, and how his Cossacks targeted people from the Caucasus in raids on airports, railway stations, hotels and on the streets.<sup>21</sup>

In March 2001, UCSJ's Krasnodar monitor reported on how Cossacks routinely terrorize ethnic minorities while working hand in hand with the police:

Many analysts had high hopes for the improvement of interethnic relations in the Krasnodar region when Alexander Tkachyov was elected as governor last December. More importantly than his experience as a kolkhoz director or participation in Council of Europe committees, Tkachyov is not seen as a younger version of the antisemitic and racist former governor, Nikolai Kondratenko. Both local Jewish and Armenian organizations (two minorities often victimized by xenophobic propaganda in the media) came out in support of Tkachyov, hoping the new administration would work to neutralize discriminatory employment and registration practices as well as reduce Cossack organizations' influence on the police.

Unfortunately the connection between the police and Cossack vigilante groups is alive and well. Over the last ten years, the flow of refugees from conflict zones of the Caucasus (Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabagh) and migrants from the former Soviet republics into the region has been met by major backlashes from Russian extremist and Cossack groups. Largely due to a "lumping together" effect and to the fact that many of the first refugees were survivors of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia, Cossack groups focused much of their activities on the so-called "Armenian invasion" of Krasnodar. Armenophobia became one of the leading human rights problems of the region in the 1990s and culminated in the form of organized anti-Armenian mass violence in 1998 in Slavyansk-na-Kubane. And while interethnic conflict has been contained more in recent years, there are still countless incidents of illegal police raids, Cossack beatings of minorities, and a coordinated political effort to disenfranchise "persons of Caucasian nationality." Recently a new incident has come to the attention of UCSJ.

In early March 2001, while members of the "F" family were sleeping in the Pashkovskaya district of Krasnodar, a drunkard wandered onto their property screaming, and injured herself. After regaining consciousness, she gathered together a Cossack band and called the police to the "F" residence and accused the family's two sons of "beating a defenseless Russian woman." The police, accompanied by two Cossacks, arrived at 3 AM, bursting into the house without a search warrant looking for the two boys accused of the beating. When it became clear that both boys were not even at the house at the time of the supposed beating, the Cossacks, with the permission of the police, began intimidating the head of the household and confiscated his passport. The next two days, the Cossack gang returned to the house a total of seven times demanding that the "two Armenians criminals" be handed over. When one of the family's sons returned from his trip on Monday, the Cossacks returned. The vigilantes threatened "F" with the statement: "This costs \$10,000 but we are going to take \$7,000 from you." Meanwhile the police have refused to return the father's passport until the "suspects" are brought to trial.

Over the next several days, the Cossack band has returned to the "F" family and demanded that they "hand over the older son." According to "F," the Cossack group told her: "If you do not turn in your son to us we will beat you or your husband." When she informed them that she did not have enough money to pay them what they are demanding they said: "Just sell your car and give us the money." The neighborhood of this incident, Pashkovskaya, is the native locality of the head of the All-Kuban Host, Vladimir Gromov, and is known for its highly mobilized local Cossack units.<sup>22</sup>

Also in March 2001, Minister for Federation Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy Aleksandr Blokhin visited the village of Varenikovskaya, where Cossacks live near a large settlement of Meskhetian Turks—an ethnic group that was deported by Stalin in 1944 from Georgia to Central

Asia and in 1989 had to flee pogroms in Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley. Many came to Krasnodar Kray, since the Georgian authorities refused (and still refuse) to allow them to return to their homeland. *Izvestiya* reported the reaction of local Cossacks to Minister Blokhin's visit in the following way:

About 300 people were crowding around the village council building when the VIP arrived. Impassioned villagers had left everything in order to come and say a decisive "Turks, Get Out of Krasnodar!" or "We Don't Want Another Kosovo!"

"We know that there are certain problems concerning the presence of Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Kray. That is why an inter-departmental government commission has been set up. I want to hear constructive proposals," the minister began.

"What would you do, Mr. Minister, if foreigners were squatting in your house?" a Cossack asked directly.

"That is the wrong way of looking at the issue," Blokhin objected indignantly. "The Turks are not in Krasnodar Kray of their own volition. We cannot load them into trains and deport them. Moreover, there are 176 ethnic groups living in Russia. How can you choose the peoples with whom you will or won't live?"

"We will live with anyone, but not with the Turks," the Cossacks persisted. "They are uninvited guests, and they want to stay here forever."

In an explicit reference to the 1989 pogroms in Uzbekistan, Cossacks then promised the Minister that there would be "an explosion 100 times more powerful than in Ferghana" if the Meskhetian Turks didn't leave the region.<sup>23</sup>

Not surprisingly, *Kubanskije novosti* expressed sympathy for the Cossacks of Varenikovskaya and hostility towards the Meskhetian Turks. In covering Minister Blokhin's visit, the paper put all the blame for the Cossacks' anger on the Meskhetian Turks, accusing them of a variety of crimes, from drug-dealing to raping old men and orphans, to which the Cossacks, naturally, had to react using vigilante justice. The author of the article added indignantly that the Meskhetian Turks are also "rather aggressively" demanding the right to vote and the right to freedom of movement in the region, appealing to international human rights organizations for support. However, local Cossack leaders vowed that they would never let this happen.<sup>24</sup>

In May 2001, RFE/RL reported on Cossack attacks on Meskhetian Turks:

Local Cossacks in the Krymskii Raion in Krasnodar Krai have been conducting a campaign of violence against the stores and homes belonging to Meskhetians, RFE/RL's Krasnodar correspondent reported on 25 April. The conflict started on 13 April when an old man, who was an ethnic Russian, was beaten outside a store in the village of Novoukrainskoye, and rumors circulated that the man had been attacked by "Turks," which is how the Meskhetians are generally referred to. Representatives of the local society representing the Meskhetians tried—unsuccessfully—to convince the Cossacks that the "hooligans" involved in the attack were not "Turks" but Azerbaijanis born in Georgia. The Meskhetian community is split between those who consider themselves Turks, and those who believe they are ethnic Georgians.

Two days after the attack, four busloads of Cossacks arrived in the town dressed in camouflage, carrying batons and gas pistols. Ivan Bezuglyi, the ataman of the Tamansk department of the Kuban Cossack forces, went up to one house where a Turkish-Meskhetian family was residing and declared that the Cossacks had arrived to check their passports. According to the correspondent, the Cossacks for the most part found that most of the adults were at work, but all the men who they did find at home were rounded up in buses and taken away. After the leaders of the Turkish-Meskhetian society finally managed to get the local police to intervene, the Cossacks released some six men of Turkish descent. They had been beaten severely, their clothes ripped and faces

bloodied. And despite repeated requests, their personal documents were not returned to them by the Cossacks.

On the same day, as the men were taken away, a group of masked men from one of the Cossack buses entered a shop owned by a Meskhetian and beat one of the shop's assistants and pulled all the goods off the store's shelves. Although several Turkish-Meskhetians were treated for wounds in the hospital, so far no criminal proceedings in the matter have been launched.

According to RFE/RL's Krasnodar correspondent, the incidents are only the most recent manifestation of tension between the two communities. The correspondent reported on 24 March that Ataman Bezuglyi has demanded at numerous unsanctioned meetings the more or less quick expulsion of ethnic "Turks" from the Kuban, using as his main argument "the age-old incompatibility of Slavic and Turkish populations." The Cossacks have also accused the Turks of showing a lack of respect for their Cossack neighbors, and of providing assistance to radical Muslim organizations.

There are some 13,500 Meskhetians in the krai, according to official information, but unofficial estimates put the total at 20,000. Of this number only some 2,500 have Russian citizenship, the rest are residing with temporary registration, having become persons without citizenship as of 1 February.<sup>25</sup>

Also in May, a local newspaper reported that drunken Cossacks had beaten up a bartender and a security guard in the Valentine Café in the city of Anapa out of racist motives. In contrast to the majority of other such attacks, the Cossacks were arrested. The paper added that in 2000, Anapa Cossacks had attacked non-Russian merchants in the city market.<sup>26</sup>

On July 10, 2001 Cossacks and other citizens protesting the new Land Code blocked the Rostov-Novorossiysk highway. Participants carried such slogans as "Russia works for Jews and Masons."<sup>27</sup>

In August, a magazine published in Moscow interviewed a Cossack farmer in Krasnodar who raved about "kikes" being "guilty of everything" bad happening in Russia.<sup>28</sup> That same month, Cossacks in Krymsk protested against plans by the town's Armenian community to combine celebrations of the town's annual day with the 1,700<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Armenian acceptance of Christianity. An Armenian news agency reported that in Anapa, the Armenian community's insistence on marking this anniversary despite a ban by the city authorities led to clashes with local Cossacks.<sup>29</sup>

In October, the Kuban Cossack Host held a meeting, attended by Nikolai Kondratenko. The group's ataman (chieftan)—Vladimir Gromov, who also holds an official post in the regional government dealing with Cossack issues and the training of youth for military service—reportedly referred to Meskhetian Turks and Kurds as unwanted visitors who have created inter-ethnic tension to the region. Mr. Kondratenko praised Ataman Gromov, claiming that he was a leader capable of saving the region from unspecified yet easy to guess "dark forces" intent on dragging Russia into another world war.<sup>30</sup>

On November 30, 2001 around 60 Cossacks severely beat five Meskhetian Turks in the village of Shkolny, Krymsky District after bursting into their home. All were taken to the hospital, two of them suffering from the after-effects of tear gas in addition to the beatings. A camera crew from NTV was reportedly stopped from interviewing the men in the hospital on December 2.<sup>31</sup>

In December, a local television show reported that Cossacks are targeting some of the 8,000 Kurds who live in Krasnodar.<sup>32</sup> A few days later, a local newspaper reported a clash between Cossacks and Meskhetian Turks and Yezidis in the Krymsky District after an alleged attempt to rape Russian boys.<sup>33</sup> A couple of weeks later, Cossack leaders in the Krymsky District demanded that a referen-

dum be held on deporting migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus if their numbers exceed 15% of the district's population.<sup>34</sup> Shortly afterwards, *Kubanskije novosti* published an interview with the newly elected head of a Cossack organization called the All-Kuban Cossack Host. Vasily Komlatsky told the interviewer: "We support the governor in his tough, uncompromising position on migration."<sup>35</sup>

### *Other Extremist Groups*

In a February 2001 interview, Aleksandr Tarasov, a leading expert on skinheads in Russia, estimated that there are between several hundred and 1,000 skinheads in Krasnodar.<sup>36</sup>

In March 2001, UCSJ's local monitor sent in the following report on RNU and skinhead activity in the city of Krasnodar:

On Krasnodar's central square at Chapaev Street, informally known as the "Arbat," several vendors sell sew-on neo-Nazi paraphanelia. Mixed together with patches of rock groups and satanic symbols, patches that read "Skinheads" and "White Power" are available in the most popular outdoor bazaar in the city. Vendors also sell confederate flags. These items are thought to be supplied by a local skinhead club which hangs a confederate flag above its door located on one of Krasnodar's biggest boulevards, Severnaya Street. The incitement of ethnic hatred is illegal in Russia, carrying a penalty of 3-5 years in prison, but the law is rarely applied.

A new wave of neo-Nazi graffiti has covered Krasnodar's "Anniversary" neighborhood in the past several days. The local branch of the RNU has painted stylized swastikas on dozens of buildings, doors, gates, schools, and public areas. In addition to these symbols, various slogans have appeared in connection with the trial of a Russian officer, Budanov, accused of the rape and murder of a Chechen girl last year (See the Rostov chapter). These statements include "Glory to the Russian Savior Budanov," and "Freedom to Budanov, A Hero of Great Rus." The RNU is very active in Krasnodar's "Anniversary" region most likely because it is an area populated heavily by the families of policemen, one of the extremist group's traditional social bases.<sup>37</sup>

In March 2001, Galina Goldner—the head of the regional Jewish organization "Shalom"—requested police help in removing antisemitic graffiti in the region. At a meeting between ethnic minority organizations and police officials, Ms. Goldner pointed out her concern over slogans like "Kikes, get out of Russia" appearing on walls throughout the region. The local police chief promised to look into the matter.<sup>38</sup> The next month, UCSJ's regional monitor reported that antisemitic slogans such as "Beat the Jews, Save Russia!", "We Wish You Happy Kike Holidays, Kike!" and "As the Russian Starves, the Jew Stuffs Himself!" continued to cover the walls of many neighborhoods in Krasnodar. Accompanying each slogan was a stylized swastika, the symbol of the RNU.<sup>39</sup>

In May 2001, a local newspaper reported on this graffiti after the head of the "Shalom" Jewish community—Galina Goldner—appealed to the mayor of the city to clean it up. There appeared to have been no response from the city authorities to this appeal, as the reporter found swastikas and antisemitic slogans all over the neighborhood. The author of the article urged readers to join in an action to clean the illegal graffiti up.<sup>40</sup>

In August 2001, police arrested swastika-wearing RNU members in the resort town of Goryachy Klyuch. Police confiscated rifles, gas masks and manuals on terrorist operations during the arrest.<sup>41</sup>

Also in August, anti-fascist activists from the School of Peace in Novorossiysk reported receiving threats from local extremists angry at their activities. In addition, on the night of August 1, the walls of the School's headquarters were covered with antisemitic slogans, insults directed against anti-

fascist activists and a swastika.<sup>42</sup> On the night of August 13, unidentified people smashed the window of the group's headquarters with a club. The School of Peace reported the incident to the police, but at the same time criticized the local authorities for their inaction.<sup>43</sup> In May 2001, School of Peace director Vadim Karastelyov told UCSJ's Krasnodar monitor that after his organization organized a clean-up of fascist graffiti in the city in 2000, RNU thugs had called him a "traitor" and threatened to throw grenades into his office. In addition, on at least one occasion, the RNU attacked merchants from the Caucasus at the city market.<sup>44</sup>

Activist from the School of Peace have in the past been targeted by local authorities, who seem much less tolerant of anti-fascists than neo-Nazis. For example, in September 2001, a printing house in the city of Anapa, under the pressure of local authorities, backed out of an agreement to print a newspaper published by School of Peace. Trouble started for the School of Peace when the printer learned that the paper would contain an article on discrimination against the Meskhetian Turks. The head of the printing house, Tatyana Grigorenko, reportedly asked Vadim Karastelyov what issues the newspaper would cover and got very upset when he replied that it would contain an article on the Meskhetian Turks. She left for ten minutes and when she returned, she reportedly informed him that "we don't have the right" to print such an article. Mr. Karastelyov called this "a new censorship."

The article repeats reports of government persecution against the Meskhetian Turks that have been widely covered by Russian and international human rights groups. It concludes with the following quote: "It turns out that we have victimized an entire people, driving it from place to place for over 50 years already. We victimize them, but it is not understood why."<sup>45</sup>

In December 2001, the trial of Valentin Demenchuk—the former head of the local branch of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDPR—began in Gelendzhik. Mr. Demenchuk was charged with storing ammunition and calling for the expulsion of the town's mayor.<sup>46</sup>

#### *Other Antisemitic Incidents*

Just before the Krasnodar mayoral elections held in December 2000, a large amount of antisemitic graffiti appeared directed at a candidate rumored to be Jewish named Evlanov. The words "Evlanov is a kike" appeared in several places in the center of the city.<sup>47</sup> That same month, the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of Krasnodar and Novorossiysk sent a complaint to the regional elections commission about the distribution of leaflets that incited hatred against religion as well as antisemitism.<sup>48</sup> UCSJ is not aware of any results stemming from the archbishop's complaint.

#### *Antisemitic Media*

In November 2000, *Komsomolskaya pravda* reported on the publication in Krasnodar of a 460 page collection of speeches by Nikolai Kondratenko, edited by Nikolai Rotov—a member of the local branch of the Union of Writers. Not surprisingly, the book is filled with quotes such as the following:

We will scatter the Zionist mafia in Krasnodar! We will expose all of its insides! We will shake the entire region! And they won't ever want to appear on the political horizon again. They will get smeared onto the wall... Your Zionist rule will not happen.<sup>49</sup>

A January 2001 article written by another member of the Union of Writers published in *Kubanskije*

*novosti* (the official newspaper of the regional administration) about Mr. Rotov's latest book argued that while he didn't totally agree with Mr. Rotov's idea that Zionism is destroying Russia, he had to admit that "there is no smoke without fire" and that "the bloody transformers of Russian history are very often not native Russians."<sup>50</sup>

That same month, the antisemitic journal *Molodaya gvardiya* published an article by Vitaly Kanashkin—a professor at Krasnodar State University—in which he blasted the "dual loyalty of so many 'Russian Jews'—Berezovsky, Urinson, Yasin, Gusinsky, Kirienko, and etc. and etc."<sup>51</sup>

In March 2001, the Big Jury of the Union of Journalists of Russia issued a decision recommending that charges of inciting ethnic hatred be brought against the editor of the Novorossiysk newspaper *Novorossiysky rabochy* for a November 16, 2000 article in which the paper published, without comment, the words of a local skinhead who called for the deportation of Jews and people from the Caucasus.<sup>52</sup>

The local newspaper *Za Rus!* continued to incite hatred against Jews in 2001. A typical example was an article in issue #5 of that year which called the September 11 terrorist attacks "an Arab blow to the kike face of the world financial system."<sup>53</sup>

In Sochi, UCSJ's Moscow bureau chief reported in July 2001 that the local newspaper *Russky vestnik Sochi* regularly publishes antisemitic articles. The paper was officially registered in February 2001 with a circulation of 3,000. A typical example of its content comes from issue #2 of 2001 which contained an article by A. Banin about how Jews "invented" fascism and antisemitism and how "Zionists" destroyed the USSR. In addition, Mr. Brod saw "Mein Kampf" on sale in the city for 405 rubles. The elderly woman selling the book urged him to buy it, assuring him that Hitler's notoriously tedious and disgusting book is "an easy read."

### *Xenophobia*

The regional authorities conduct an openly discriminatory policy of denying registration to Meskhetian Turks, Armenians, Kurds and other non-Russians who recently migrated to Krasnodar Kray, in many cases fleeing wars and, in the case of the Meskhetian Turks and Armenians from Azerbaijan, pogroms. Without registration, the legal status of the migrants' jobs, homes and even marriages are thrown into question, leaving these groups vulnerable to harassment and extortion by police and vigilante Cossack groups (see the section on Cossack organizations above). Officials and media controlled by the regional administration constantly harp on the "threat" posed by these migrants, often using openly racist language.

In December 2000, UCSJ's regional monitor learned about a broadcast on local television of a documentary that featured officials from the Krymsk and Abinsk regions blaming Meskhetian Turks for the districts' high crime rate. Local Cossack leaders were filmed arguing that the Meskhetian Turks are spies and that regions settled by them could turn into another Kosovo.<sup>54</sup>

Also in December 2000, the human rights group Memorial released a report on problems facing refugees from Abkhazia in Krasnodar Kray. According to the report, a significant number of these refugees, who are mostly ethnic Georgians, have not received registration and therefore "are deprived of a shocking majority of basic rights and freedoms and suffer from various forms of ethnic discrimination."<sup>55</sup>

In January 2001, a local newspaper quoted Governor Tkachyov blaming migrants for rising crime, squeezing out Russians and behaving like they are the masters in the region, rather than a bunch of unwanted guests.<sup>56</sup> An article that same month in *Krasnodarskie izvestiya* by Oleg Matveev—a professor of history at Kuban State University—argued that migrants provoke inter-ethnic tension, which plays right into the hands of Russia’s enemies (whom the learned professor for some reason left undefined).<sup>57</sup> In late January, Vladimir Beketov—chairman of the regional legislature—argued that Meskhetian Turks are trying to seize control of parts of the region in order to one day create an “Islamic Republic of the Kuban.”<sup>58</sup> In a March 2001 interview with a local paper printed under the hysterical title “Are We a Country or a Revolving Door?” Mr. Beketov speculated on what he sees as sinister motives behind the fact that many migrants have supposedly settled near tunnels, railway lines and oil pipelines.<sup>59</sup>

In February 2001, the “Vatan” Meskhetian Turks organization in the region sent an appeal to President Putin complaining of official discrimination and a rash of attacks by Cossacks who are inflicting on Meskhetian Turks:

[B]eatings, arrests and insults not just in public places, but in private homes too... The impunity enjoyed by those who order and those who carry out these outrages leads to the distribution of nationalistic leaflets, the spreading of rumors and the manipulation of public opinion, leading to open threats to a repeat of “Bloody Fergana” [a reference to the pogroms in Uzbekistan that forced the Meskhetian Turks to flee to Krasnodar in the first place]... We are deprived of all constitutional rights and responsibilities: we are without status, without the right to work or receive pensions or subsidies, without appropriate medical care, without the registration of marriages, without the right to vote or be elected, without the right to an education (except a middle education) or to be rehabilitated, without the right to birth certificates of newborns indicating the father’s name, without the right to a Russian Federation passport, without the right to buy or sell private property... The fact is that the so-called problem of the Meskhetian Turks exists solely in Krasnodar Kray. In all other regions of the Russian Federation they are recognized as full citizens. This problem doesn’t exist even where there are more Turks living than in Krasnodar Kray. Let us remember that in the republics of the Near Abroad there are between 100-150,000 of us.<sup>60</sup>

In a very disturbing sign of the times, in April, the Russian government’s newspaper *Rossiyskaya gazeta* echoed the Krasnodar authorities’ racist paranoia by reporting that: “As analysts from the FSB Administration of Krasnodar Kray **reasonably believe** [emphasis added], the Turkish secrets services are attempting to turn the Meskhetian Turkish community into a ‘fifth column.’ Therefore, its activists were instructed to settle down in the Kuban and never leave it, which is what they are doing.”<sup>61</sup>

In June, *Kubanskiye novosti* warned that passage of the Land Code would lead to the break up of Russia, since Meskhetian Turks and Armenians would take the opportunity to buy land in Krasnodar Kray.<sup>62</sup>

In a radio broadcast on October 4, 2001 Governor Tkachyov blamed Meskhetian Turks and Roma (Gypsies) for the drug trade in the region.<sup>63</sup> Shortly afterwards, on October 12, around 115 Roma were forced into a dozen vehicles and deported from the city of Krasnodar to the Voronezh region. Deputy Mayor Nikolai Petrikov justified the deportation by arguing that the Roma had built homes without any permission.<sup>64</sup>

In November, Kurds staged a demonstration protesting prejudicial statements by Governor Tkachyov.<sup>65</sup>

*Religious Intolerance*

In December 2000, a local newspaper announced that Krasnodar law enforcement agencies had completed a study of the activities of Mormons in the region. The author of the article warned that:

The danger for people who are not in the know is that Mormons, hiding behind Christian phraseology, are in reality fighting against Christianity... Their activity looks more like the collection of intelligence information about our country than service to God.<sup>66</sup>

In October 2001, a news agency reported that Muslims in Krasnodar, Sochi and Anapa have not been able to build mosques, and are instead forced to pray in apartments or rented spaces. Local Muslim leaders reportedly blame official obstruction to their plans to acquire land to build houses of worship.<sup>67</sup>

**REPUBLIC OF ADYGEA***Highlights from the Previous Report*

A Internet-based news service reported that foreign missionaries in the republic “had their lives threatened several times.”

*Antisemitic Incidents*

In February 2001, a newspaper reported that right before elections to the republic’s State Council, leaflets were distributed accusing one of the candidates—Nina Konovalova, leader of the Union of Adygea’s Slavs—of being a secret Jew: “Against the background of a huge Star of David, the leaflets tell how Ms. Konovalova, an offspring of an old rabinnic kin of Lyubavich Chasids, met many times with Vladimir Gusinsky, who introduced her to members of the ‘Russian Jewish elite.’”<sup>68</sup>

In April 2001, an anonymous source reported that the Russian Orthodox Church in Adygea is building a church over an old Jewish cemetery in Maykop. According to this source, the Jewish community in Maykop is one of the least organized in the North Caucasus and therefore there is no Jewish organization in Adygea able to protest the construction of the Church. Reportedly, many Jews in Adygea are highly dismayed and afraid to protest.

**REPUBLIC OF CHECHNYA<sup>69</sup>**

Estimated Jewish Population: Once relatively large, but currently unknown.<sup>70</sup>

*Highlights from the Previous Report*

Chechen rebel leaders made numerous antisemitic statements in media interviews and pro-Chechen rebel web sites, which appear to be under the control of the Chechen rebel leadership, often carried antisemitic articles. Some criminal gangs operating from Chechnya specialized in the kidnapping of Jews, who were treated more harshly than other captives. A delegation of nationalist Russian writers visiting the front lines in 2000 witnessed with approval how extremist publications like *Nash*

*sovremennik* were being widely read by Russian troops.

The fighting in Chechnya resulted in growing “Islamophobia” in Russia. According to a poll, the number of Russians who viewed Islam as a “bad thing” grew enormously. The result has been a high level of brutality by Russian troops stationed in Chechnya. The newspaper *Moskovsky komsomolets* reported in September 2000 that with most hostilities having ceased, “bored” Russian soldiers were increasingly engaging in random killings of civilians. Russian Orthodox, Baptist and Pentecostal clergy and parishioners were kidnapped, assaulted, raped, and murdered by Chechen rebels and criminal gangs.

### *Official Antisemitism*

Both the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership and the Chechen rebel leadership use antisemitism as a propaganda weapon, primarily by labeling enemy leaders as hidden Jews. For example, in October 2001, pro-Russian Chechen administrator Akhmad Kadyrov asserted that the infamous Islamic fundamentalist rebel commander Khattab is not a Jordanian Arab, but a Yemeni Jew. As “proof,” Mr. Kadyrov claimed that Khattab named his daughter Sarah.<sup>71</sup> Later that month, Mr. Kadyrov was interviewed on Moscow’s TV-Tsentr and asked whether his statement about Khattab means that he believes in Jewish conspiracies. He answered by repeating his far-fetched claim:

I wouldn’t want that nation [the Jews] to think badly of me. They are the smartest nation on earth, first of all, the smartest because they can look 100 years into the future. Secondly, there is nothing insulting here [in his statement about Khattab]. It really was so that during my last trip to Iraq, officials there told me that Khattab is not a Saudi or a Jordanian, but of Yemeni ancestry—a Jew. I said, why does he hide his ethnicity? I am not ashamed to say that I am a Chechen. If a person hides his ethnicity, that means that he is afraid of something.<sup>72</sup>

Mr. Kadyrov may have been motivated by the fact that in 2000, the Chechen rebel web site Kavkaz-Tsentr charged that Mr. Kadyrov is not a Chechen, but a Mountain Jew from Dagestan. [See the previous report]

In response to Mr. Kadyrov’s statement, the Tbilisi-based Chechen-press news agency rather hypocritically criticized Mr. Kadyrov for “expressing his antisemitic views and his dislike for Jews.”<sup>73</sup>

In November 2001, Colonel Akhmed Kelimatov—a former top police official in the last Chechen administration before the collapse of the Soviet Union—told a St. Petersburg paper that the father of the Chechen rebel movement—the late President of Chechnya Dzhokar Dudaev—was in fact a hidden Jew. According to Colonel Kelimatov, back in 1991:

A general of non-Chechen origin who was barely known to Chechens came among us. The fact that Dudaev was not a Chechen, but a pure-blooded Tat, that is, a Mountain Jew, was being talked about to his friends by the rector of Grozny University Viktor Abramovich Kankalik as early as 1992. Kankalik said that the grandfather of Dzhokar Duda [name as in the original] was a Tat who came from Ingushetia to Buynaksk. Soon after these conversations, Kankalik disappeared and was found only after several days buried in the forest region near Grozny. Later it was learned that he had been kidnapped and shot by the then chief of Dudaev’s security.<sup>74</sup>

The Chechen rebel leadership has at times charged Russian intelligence agencies with disseminating forged documents and falsely attributed statements in order to paint the rebels as antisemitic. For example, in April 2001, the Chechenpres news agency cited President Maskhadov rejecting charges of antisemitism as a provocation by the Russian government and comparing the Chechen struggle to

that of the Jews, both of whom he charged had suffered from Russian chauvinism.<sup>75</sup> He may have been responding to reports in the Russian news media that he had issued orders to “expose Zionist agents working in international non-governmental organizations in the Chechen Republic.”<sup>76</sup> In his memoir about the war, General Gennady Troshev—former second in command of Russian forces in Chechnya—touches on this theme as well, using language that sounds frighteningly similar to the infamous antisemitic forgery “Catechism of a Jew in the USSR.” Claiming to quote from a 1997 speech given at a terrorist training camp in Chechnya by warlord Salman Raduev, General Troshev writes that the Chechen leader told trainees: “It is necessary for you to pour filth on those Russians who are patriotically inclined, it is very easy to charge them with fascism, antisemitism and nationalism.”<sup>77</sup>

Whether such documents and statements are genuine or not, it is clear that some Chechen rebel leaders—many of whom are Islamic fundamentalists—have spread antisemitic propaganda, including in media under their control, and in foreign and domestic media not controlled by the Russian government (see the previous report for several examples).

In September 2001, a newspaper reported that Chechen rebels captured a private television in the village of Avtury and used the stolen air time to denounce “the international Zionist conspiracy” against Muslims.<sup>78</sup>

The day after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, the Chechen rebel web site Kavkaz-Tsentran ran a report speculating that Israel may have been behind the attacks.<sup>79</sup> The next month, former president of Chechnya Zelimkhan Yandarbiev gave a lengthy interview to web site in which he asserted that:

What September 11 shows us is that the fathers of the so-called world community—the Christian-Zionist neo-empire—have covered themselves up with the fig leaf of so-called international law... And “their people,” in other words, their “enemies” are first of all Muslims, the whole Muslim world and those who are seeking their own righteous path in life or any other path that differs from the instructions of the international criminal syndicate known as the United Nations and its masters... The world sees that it was precisely the USA together with the leaders of the main Christian states in collaboration with international Zionism that are the initiators and protagonists of this division. It saw that this division had been carried out on a purely religious basis, and that it directed its main blow against world Islam, the Muslim nation and every Muslim and people in their concrete manifestations...

If the USA is seeking international terrorism in an insolent and open form, it is being committed by Russia, India and Israel in the most cynical way. If they want to see what a covert and refined terrorist gentleman looks like, they should look at themselves in the mirror. I am even inclined to believe that this might have been the work of US secret services, which have the capabilities for such a thing and who have long been engaged in zombification and affecting people’s minds along with the Russians and the Zionists.

...Allah punished the USA for usurping illegal rights and I am sure that this will not be the last retaliatory blow if they do not repent before Allah (Glory be to Him!), if they do not rein in their criminal pride, do not give up the role of an idol or God and do not recognize the laws and power of the Creator of all the worlds. If the Americans kill even one innocent person, regardless of what he is—Afghan, Arab, Chechen or American—this victim will outweigh all of the victims of September 11 in the eyes of the Creator because this action will not be committed by a group of conspirators blinded by their desire for revenge and limited in their choice of means and methods, but by people in power who have the most powerful technical and military means at their disposal.<sup>80</sup>

Later that month, the same web site reported that: “The so-called world community, which for some reason is represented exclusively by the countries from the Christian-Jewish alliance, is trying to

thrust upon the world an image of the ‘civilized world’s’ enemy with a Muslim face.’<sup>81</sup>



Movladi Udugov

Kavkaz-Tsentr is reportedly controlled by Chechen rebel propagandist Movladi Udugov. According to a Russian web-based newspaper, Mr. Udugov, whose antisemitic beliefs were documented in UCSJ’s previous report, also controls a newspaper called *Kavkazsky vestnik*, which is filled with antisemitic and anti-Russian content.<sup>82</sup>

### *Kidnapping of Jews*

Kidnapping, which had become something of a local industry, has sharply decreased since the return of Russian troops to Chechnya. In March 2001, two Chechen warlords named Ruslan Akhmadov and Badruddin Murtazaev who specialized in kidnapping Jews and tortured many of their several dozen victims were arrested in Azerbaijan.<sup>83</sup> A third member of their gang—Saburali Dibirov—was arrested by Russian agents shortly afterwards.<sup>84</sup>

In June 2001, Chechen field commander Arbi Baraev—a notorious antisemite (see UCSJ’s previous report) and kidnapper known to have personally killed an estimated 200 people—was himself killed by Russian forces. He is blamed not only for targeting Jews, but also for killing a Russian general, four engineers from the UK and New Zealand (whom he decapitated), and numerous Russian soldiers, as well as inventing a sadistic game called “Chechen Bingo” in which captives were forced to do push ups and the first to tire was shot.<sup>85</sup>

A Spaniard who survived his kidnapping by Chechen rebels in the Panski Gorge region of Georgia recounted that early in his captivity:

A tall man dressed all in black came in and started shouting something in Russian. Francisco said that he didn’t understand. A blow to the face knocked him to the wall. The man pulled him up from the floor and shouted directly into his ear that we were Masons,<sup>86</sup> Jews, and millionaires and that we were dealing drugs, so our just fate is death.<sup>87</sup>

When his wife contacted the kidnapers and tried to persuade them that she didn’t have enough money for the ransom, she was reportedly called a Jew and told to ask Russian media magnate and Jewish leader Vladimir Gusinsky for money.<sup>88</sup>

In August 2001, a Samara newspaper profiled Svetlana Kuzmina, a local woman who was rescued from two years of captivity in Chechnya that month. Ms. Kuzmina told of what happened to other captives, including a Jew named Terentev, who was treated harsher than other captives because of his ethnicity.<sup>89</sup>

### *Antisemitic Incidents*

In September 2000, the *London Jewish Chronicle* reported that a young Jewish couple from Grozny has shown up at a London synagogue looking for food and help with their asylum application. The 26 year old man and his pregnant 22 year old wife told a harrowing tale:

The couple married in 1998 and later fled the fighting in Grozny, the Chechen capital, for St Petersburg. They have told WJR [World Jewish Relief] officials, who are representing them, that both sets of parents were killed in separate incidents during the fighting in Chechnya.